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I. Introduction
In the mid-1980s, the People's Republic of China ("China" or
the "PRC") began to improve its semiconductor manufacturing
capability.' Two decades later, the gap between U.S. and Chinese
semiconductor manufacturing technology has significantly
narrowed. Today, China's most advanced semiconductor
manufacturing facilities can produce integrated circuits ("IC") that
are less than one generation behind the most advanced IC's in the
semiconductor industry. 2 China's stated goal is to become self-
sufficient in the production of semiconductors for its domestic
market and to develop technology that is competitive on the world
market.' This strategic goal is being pursued for both economic
and national security reasons and is directed by a series of five-
year economic plans and projects that focus on high-technology
industries. For example, in China's Tenth Five-Year Plan on
Information Industry,4 it is envisaged that by 2005, the value of
information technology products manufactured by China will
reach RMB 2,500 billion (approximately $300 billion) with a 20%
annual growth rate.5 Its corresponding industrial value-added will
increase to RMB 320 billion (approximately $38 billion), sales
revenue will reach RMB 1,500 billion (approximately $180
billion), and exports volume will increase to $100 billion, at an
average growth rate of 15% per year.6 By 2005, China is set to
I U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., EXPORT CONTROLS: RAPID ADVANCES IN CHINA'S
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY UNDERSCORE NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL U.S. POLICY REVIEW,
GAO-02-620, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02620.pdf (Apr. 2002).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 MINISTRY OF INFORMATION INDUSTRY OF THE PRC, THE TENTH FIVE-YEAR (2001
- 2005) PLAN - INFORMATION INDUSTRY, available at http://www.trp.hku.hk/infofile
/china/2002/10-5-yr-plan.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
5 Id.
6 Id.
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have an annual production capacity of 20 billion integrated
circuits, 400 billion electronic chips, and 18 million sets of
microcomputers.7
Against the backdrop of the Chinese government's efforts to
foster the IC industry, a number of incentive programs and
policies favoring domestic IC fabricators and designers have been
formulated and implemented since 2000. A landmark government
document to this effect is the Circular Regarding Issuance of
Certain Policies Concerning the Development of the Software and
Integrated Circuit Industry8 issued by the State Council of the
PRC (the highest level of government institution in China's central
executive hierarchy) on June 24, 2000 ("Circular No. 18"). 9 This
document introduces a number of preferential policies for software
and IC industries, ranging from financing to taxation, labor, and
intellectual property issues.1" Subsequent to the promulgation of
Circular No. 18, China's ministerial and local government
agencies issued a number of implementing rules and specific
guidelines in order to carry out the policies articulated in Circular
No. 18.11 Some of these government documents provide
enterprises involved in China's software and IC industries with
more government incentives than those contained in Circular No.
18.12
Driven by these favorable investment incentive policies and
the relatively low labor costs in China, more and more leading IC
fabricators and equipment suppliers have been rushing to China to
establish their facilities since the implementation of Circular No.
18 and its subsequent legislations. For example, Motorola has
built a $1.9 billion fabrication facility in Tianjin, IBM has
announced plans to build a large-scale semiconductor packaging
and test base in Shanghai, NEC has invested in a semiconductor
7 Id.
8 Circular Regarding Issuance of Certain Policies Concerning the Development of
the Software and Integrated Circuit Industry (2000) [hereinafter Circular No. 18].
9 For a full text translation of the policies underlying Circular No. 18, see State
Council, Encouraging the Development of the Software and Integrated Circuit Industries
Several Policies 5600/2000.06.24, 14 CHINA L. & PRAC. 48 n.7 (2000).
10 See id.
11 See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
12 Id.
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fabrication joint venture in Shanghai with registered capital of
$700 million, and Intel and AMD have built their wholly-owned
semiconductor assembly and test facilities in Shanghai and Suzhou
respectively, each with total investments exceeding $100 million. 3
In addition, Taiwan, the world's largest producer of
semiconductors, has also established nineteen semiconductor
fabrication plants in Shanghai, Beijing, Songjiang, and Suzhou in
an attempt to be part of the success of the Mainland China.14
Nevertheless, contemporaneous to the success of these
industry-spurring policies, complaints from foreign semiconductor
industry groups and governments also surfaced. The
complainants, led by the Semiconductor Industry Association
("SIA") and the U.S. government, claimed that incentive policies
have unjustifiably discriminated against foreign semiconductor
manufacturers and designers and, therefore, violate the rules of the
WTO, of which China has been a Member since 2001.5 The
focus of attack on China's unfair trade policies are the value-added
tax ("VAT") rebate programs as applied in the IC industry and as
provided for in Circular No. 18, together with its subsequent
legislations. 6 The discontent is described in a statement by the
SIA:
China imposes a VAT of 17% on sales of all imported and
domestically-produced semiconductors and integrated circuits.
However, current Chinese government policy provides for a
rebate of the VAT burden in excess of 3% for certain integrated
circuits manufactured within China. This discrimination against
imported semiconductors through the VAT rebate is inconsistent
13 Howard Chao & Lawrence Sussman, Semiconductor Investment Heats Up in
China: A Legal and Tax Guide, at http://www.omm.com/webcode/webdata/content/
publicationslTopics-semiconductor.pdf (June 2003) (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
14 Ben Kwok, Beijing Under Fire on Chips War, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Bus.
POST, Oct. 30, 2003, at 1.
15 See id.; see Testimony of Anne Craib, Director, International Trade and
Government Affairs, Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), Before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China's WTO Compliance and
U.S. Monitoring Efforts (2/5/04), at https://www.sia-online.org/downloads/testimony
china_040205.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004); SIA, Written Testimony for the House
Ways and Means Committee Hearing on United States-China Economic Relations and
China's Role in the Global Economy, at https://www.sia-online.org/downloads/
testimony-china_103103.pdf (Oct. 31, 2003) (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
16 Id.
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with China's WTO obligations.
GATT Article III (on "National Treatment") states that a WTO
member cannot impose taxes on imported products that are
greater than those imposed on domestic products. By rebating
the amount of the VAT burden over 3%for local products, while
continuing to impose the full 17% VAT on imported
semiconductors, the current policy violates this most basic
GATT/WTO obligation.
The semiconductor industry is a tremendously competitive
business - a fraction of a percent can make the difference in
winning or losing a sale. A 14% differential created through
WTO inconsistent tax policy is a burden that foreign companies
simply can't overcome in selling into the Chinese market.'
7
These complaints eventually escalated into a trade policy
dispute between the U.S. and Chinese governments. On March
18, 2004, the then U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR"), Robert B.
Zoellick, announced that the United States had filed a case with
the WTO regarding China's discriminatory tax rebate policy for
ICs. 8 This action began the sixty-day consultation period required
under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes19 ("DSU") of the WTO.
In July 2004, the U.S. and Chinese governments settled the
dispute after multiple rounds of consultations and negotiations.2 °
Under the terms of settlement, China will not certify any new
semiconductor products or manufacturers for eligibility for VAT
refunds and will no longer offer VAT refunds that favor ICs
designed in China.2' Further, by April 1, 2005, China will stop
17 Testimony of Anne Craib, supra note 15 (emphasis added).
18 Press Release, Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, U.S. Files
WTO Case Against China Over Discriminatory Taxes that Hurt U.S. Exports (March 18,
2004), at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2004/03/04-22.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
19 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(Annex 2 to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), Apr. 15, 1994,
art. 16, para. 4 & art. 17, para. 14, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1226.
20 China - Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits: Joint Communication from
China and the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS309/7 (July 16, 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/dispu-status_e.htm#2004 [hereinafter
China - Value Added Tax on Integrated Circuits].
21 See id.
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providing VAT refunds on Chinese-fabricated ICs to current
beneficiaries.22
Would China's VAT policies favoring its IC industries have
met the same result if the case had been reviewed by the Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") of the WTO? Was China inherently
untenable in this trade dispute? This Article attempts to examine
these questions and other WTO legal issues brought up by the
parties to the dispute. It also tries to identify and assess some
possible justifications and defenses available to China under WTO
treaties and relevant case law for its IC industry VAT rebate
programs. First, Part II introduces the factual background to
China's IC-related VAT rebate programs and preliminary
allegations made by the United States and SIA. Against this
factual background, a discussion of relevant legal issues involved
in this dispute as well as possible defenses that might be available
to China against the allegations, are presented in Parts III, IV, and
V. Part VI completes the analysis with a look at an issue which,
although not raised by the United States in its complaint, has
important implications: subsidy. Finally, the concluding remarks
of Part VII articulate an overall assessment of the defenses and
justifications for China's government with regard to its VAT
rebate programs, as well as some policy suggestions regarding its
domestic investment incentive policies vis-c4-vis existing WTO
rules.
II. Factual Background Relating to the Dispute
A. The IC-Related VAT Rebate Programs and the Legislative
Background
1. China's VAT System
In December 1993, the State Council of the PRC promulgated
the Provisional Regulations of the Value-Added Tax of the
People's Republic of China23 ("VAT Regulations"). On December
25, 1993, the Ministry of Finance of the PRC ("MOF")
promulgated the Implementing Rules for the Provisional
22 See id.
23 For a full text translation of the VAT Regulations, see HOwARD GENSLER ET AL.,
A GUIDE TO CHINA'S TAX & BUSINESS LAWS 134-40 (2d ed. 1998).
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Regulations of the Value-Added Tax of the People's Republic of
China ("VAT Implementing Rules") 24 pursuant to the VAT
Regulations. These two government regulations established the
regulatory foundation of China's VAT system, which is patterned
heavily after the VAT system adopted by the majority of Western
European countries.25
The VAT Regulations designate three types of VAT taxpayers:
(i) individuals and entities that sell goods; (ii) individuals and
entities that provide processing, fixing, or repairing services; and
(iii) individuals and entities that import goods into China.26 In
general, both the VAT rates for the sale of goods within China and
the import of goods into China are 17%.27 For sales or imports of
certain necessities, such as grains, edible vegetable oils, public
utility products (except electricity), publications, and agricultural
instruments, the applicable VAT rate is 13%.28 The VAT rate is
6% for "small scale taxpayers" under the VAT Regulations.29
Under China's VAT system, the tax is typically collected by
the seller of a product and then included in the purchase price
charged to the buyer a.3  The tax is paid at regular intervals by
enterprises to local tax bureaus. 31 The amount of the tax payable is
calculated by applying the VAT rate to the difference between the
price of the product being sold (the output VAT) and the VAT
previously paid on direct inputs, provided these inputs can be
properly documented (the input VAT). 2 The cost of fixed assets
24 For a full text translation of the VAT Implementing Rules, see id. at 141-50.
25 Xiangyuan Jiang & Jack Huang, China's New VAT System, 28 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 619, 619 (1995).
26 GENSLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 141 (Art. 1 of the VAT Regulations).
27 Id.
28 Id. (Art. 2 of the VAT Regulations).
29 Id. at 147 (Art. 24 of the VAT Implementing Rules). "Small scale taxpayers"
are those approved by the State Administration of Taxation ("SAT"') of the PRC. Id. The
term is defined in the VAT Implementing Rules to be either (i) manufacturer-sellers
whose annual sales subject to VAT are less than RMB 1 million (approximately
$120,000) or (ii) wholesalers and retailers whose annual sales subject to VAT are less
than RMB 1.8 million (approximately $210,000). Id.
30 Id. at 141-42 (Arts. 4 and 5 of the VAT Regulations).
31 Id. at 147 (Art. 23 of the VAT Regulations).
32 Id. at 141 (Arts. 4 and 5 of the VAT Regulations).
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and any other costs not directly associated with the production of
the good in question are not allowed to be credited against the
output VAT.33
For IC products (either sold by domestic manufacturers or
imported from foreign fabricators) involved in the dispute between
China and the United States, the applicable VAT rate is 17%,
unless the taxpayer is a "small scale taxpayer" under the VAT
Regulations and VAT Implementing Rules.34 The application of
VAT at a typical rate of 17% was not contested in the complaints
made by the U.S. government and industry groups.
2. China's IC Industry VAT Incentive Programs
a. VAT Incentive Programs for Domestic IC
Fabricators
The contentious VAT rebate programs devoted to China's
domestic IC fabricators are specifically articulated in Circular No.
18, which provides:
Until 2010, VAT will be levied at the statutory rate of 17% on
an ordinary VAT payer's sale of integrated circuits (including
monocrystal silicon wafers) produced by itself. The portion of
the actual tax burden in excess of 6% shall be rebated upon
collection and used by the enterprise to research and develop
new integrated circuits and to expand reproduction.35
On September 22, 2000, pursuant to Circular No. 18, the
MOF, the State Administration of Taxation ("SAT"), and the
General Administration of Customs of the PRC jointly issued the
Circular on Relevant Tax Policy Issues concerning Encouraging
the Development of Software Industry and Integrated Circuits
Industry3 6 ("Circular No. 25"), which provided some further
implementing guidance with regard to tax preferential policies
articulated in Circular No. 18.17 Circular No. 25 clarified that the
33 Id. at 143 (Art. 10(1) of the VAT Regulations).
34 Id.
35 Circular No. 18, supra note 8, art. 41 (emphasis added).
36 Circular on Relevant Tax Policy Issues concerning Encouraging the
Development of Software Industry and Integrated Circuits Industry (2000) [hereinafter
Circular No. 25].
37 Id. pmbl.
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rebated VAT to eligible domestic IC fabricators should not be
subject to income tax.38 It further defined IC products as those
"products performing specified circuits or specified functions
through electronic devices integrated with special processing
technologies on a semiconductor monocrystal chip39 or a ceramic
chip and sealed within an enclosure."4  Circular No. 25 also
stipulated that, in order to enjoy the VAT rebates articulated in
Circular No. 18, a domestic company's qualification as an "IC
fabricating enterprise" should be statutorily certified by its initial
approval authorities as well as its tax authorities.41 Such a
certification is subject to an annual review mechanism undertaken
by the government.42
Notwithstanding the definitions provided in Circular No. 25,
the "integrated circuits ... produced by itself," as mentioned in
Article 41 of Circular No. 18, are still subject to a set of
mandatory certification requirements by government authorities to
be eligible for the VAT rebate. The certification requirements and
procedures are detailed in the Administrative Measures on
Certification of Integrated Circuit Designing Enterprises and
Products43 ("IC Certification Measures") issued by the Ministry of
Information Industry ("MII") and SAT on March 7, 2002.44
38 Id. art. 2(1).
39 "Monocrystal chip" is also defined in Article 2(1) of Circular No. 25 as "a kind
of semiconductor silicon in the state of single crystal." Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. art. 3(2). In China, formation of enterprises is frequently subject to statutory
approval by the relevant government agencies. For example, the Ministry of Commerce
of the PRC and its local equivalents are the initial approval authorities of all foreign-
invested enterprises in China. Id.
42 Id. art. 3(5).
43 The Chinese version of the IC Certification Measures is available at
http://www.law-lib.com.cnlaw/law view.asp?id=40547 (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
44 According to art- 7 of the IC Certification Measures, in order to enjoy the VAT
rebate with regard to domestic IC fabricators set forth in Circular No. 18, the enterprise
concerned must submit the application first to the local tax bureau responsible for its
taxation for preliminary review. Id. (art. 7 of the IC Certification Measures). After the
preliminary review, the local tax bureau would forward the application to the SAT for
official certification. Id. The SAT should designate jointly with the MII certain
certification agencies to conduct the certification of the applicant and/or its products. Id.
In addition, according to Article 11 of the IC Certification Measures, the SAT and the
M11 are jointly carrying out an annual review system applicable to those certified
2005]
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On October 22, 2002, the threshold for VAT rebates for
domestic IC fabricators was reduced from 6% of the taxpayer's
"actual tax burden" to 3% of its "actual tax burden." The
reduction is embodied in another circular jointly issued by the
MOF and SAT: Circular on Relevant Tax Policy Issues
Concerning Furthering the Encouragement of Development of
Software Industry and Integrated Circuits Industry45 ("Circular
No. 70").46 Accordingly, the "effective VAT rate" for eligible
domestic IC fabricators has been reduced to 3%.
In addition to the IC industry VAT rebate policy, Circulars
No. 18 and No. 25 also provide an exemption from tariff and value
added taxes with respect to the importation of equipment and raw
materials by certain large scale or "current generation IC
fabricators., 47 To enjoy the zero import VAT rate and tariff rate
with respect to their fabrication necessities, these fabricators
should meet one of the following two criteria: (i) their total
investment is over RMB 8 billion (approximately $1 billion) or (ii)
they produce ICs with a linewidth of less than 0.25 microns.48
Similar to the VAT rebate program introduced above, eligibility
for this tariff/VAT exemption policy is also subject to
discretionary certification conducted by a series of central
government agencies.49 Compared to the VAT rebate programs, it
is much more difficult to obtain such certifications, and the
preference is reportedly not widely enjoyed by IC fabricators in
foreign investment enterprises."
applicants and/or their products. Id. (art. 11 of the IC Certification Measures). The IC
Certification Measures do not specify parameters for products that can be certified as IC
products.
45 Circular on Relevant Tax Policy Issues Concerning Furthering the
Encouragement of Development of Software Industry and Integrated Circuits Industry
(2002) [hereinafter Circular No. 70].
46 Notice of the Ministry of Finance, State of Administration of Taxation (Mar. 7,
2002), available at http://www.ec.cn/pubnews/2003 02_16/200609/1000749.jsp (last
visited Apr. 2, 2004).
47 Circular No. 18, supra note 8; Circular No. 25, supra note 36.
48 Circular No. 18, supra note 8, arts. 42, 44; Circular No. 25, supra note 36, art.
2(3).
49 Circular No. 25, supra note 36, art. 5(2).
50 Chao & Sussman, supra note 13, at 11 (stating that it is difficult to receive a
benefit and only four Chinese foreign investment enterprises have met the
qualifications).
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b. VAT Incentive Programs for Domestic IC
Designers
Since IC designing is an integral part of the IC industry
development, it is also encouraged through special tax incentives.
For example, Article 48 of Circular No. 18 provides:
If an integrated circuit designed by a domestic integrated circuit
designing enterprise but truly cannot be fabricated in China, the
chips may be produced abroad and, subject to the certification of
the processing contract (including its specifications and
quantity) by the authority in charge of the [IC] industry, customs
duty shall be levied on the import thereof at a provisional
preferential rate.51
In October 2002, the preferential tax treatment for IC chips
designed in China but fabricated abroad was extended to the area
of VAT, pursuant to the Circular on Tax Policies for Imports of
Integrated Circuit Products Domestically Designed and
Fabricated Abroad 2 jointly issued by the MOF and SAT
("Circular No. 140"). Circular No. 140 provides that, with respect
to ICs certified to be designed in China but fabricated abroad, an
immediate VAT rebate would also be available for any amount
collected in excess of 6% of the value added upon their
importation to China.53  Accordingly, subject to certain
certification procedures similar to those of the VAT rebate
programs for IC fabricators, the "effective VAT rate" for such IC
chips would be 6% upon importation, whereas those imported IC
chips not certified to be designed in China would still pay the
VAT at a rate of 17%. 4
B. Attacks on the VAT Rebate Programs by the U.S. Industry
and Government
U.S. policymakers and semiconductor industry groups have
been paying close attention to China's technology improvements
51 Circular No. 18, supra note 8, art. 48.
52 Circular on Tax Policies for Imports of Integrated Circuit Products
Domestically Designed and Fabricated Abroad (2002) [hereinafter Circular No. 140].
53 Id. art. 1.
54 It is also worth noting that this VAT rebate policy is retroactively effective as of
July 1, 2000. Id. art. 4.
2005]
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and industry development with respect to ICs for both political and
commercial reasons. In April -2002, members of the General
Accounting Office ("GAO") of the U.S. Congress prepared a
report urging the U.S. government to tighten technology export
controls against China in order to protect U.S. national security
and industry interests.55
In October 2003, another extensive report was disseminated by
SIA, a semiconductor industry group of the United States,
claiming that China's preferential VAT treatments had created a
cost advantage for its own production and was inconsistent with
China's commitments as a member of the WTO and in clear
violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"). 6  Specifically, the SIA report stated that the
preferential VAT rebate programs applied in China's IC industry
had provided "a partial VAT exemption for domestically designed
and manufactured integrated circuits, but not imported like
products" and appeared to be in clear violation of Article 111:2 of
the GATT.57 Further, the SIA reasoned that because the effect of
the differential VAT was to protect domestic enterprises, the
measure had also run afoul of GATT Article 111: 1 .58
In the official Request for Consultation submitted by the
USTR to the DSB,59 the allegation with respect to the violation of
the WTO rules was expressed as follows: "The United States
therefore believes that these measures are inconsistent with the
obligations of China under Articles I and III of the GATT 1994,
the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China
(WT/L/432), and Article XVII of [The General Agreement of
55 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 1.
56 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
57 THOMAS R. HOWELL ET. AL., CHINA'S EMERGING SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY:
THE IMPACT OF CHINA'S PREFERENTIAL VALUE-ADDED TAX ON CURRENT INVESTMENT
TRENDS 60 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/china-study.
pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
58 Id.
59 See China - Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits: Request for Consultation
by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS309/1, available at http://www
.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu .e/dispu-statuse.htm#2004 (last visited Apr. 2, 2004)
[hereinafter Request for Consultation].
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Trade in Services ("GATS")].,, 60 Accordingly, it appears that the
battleground of the dispute between the United States and China
had been extended to cover Article I of GATT (most-favored
nation treatment of trade in goods), Article III of GATT (national
treatment on trade in goods), and Article XVII of GATS (national
treatment of trade in services). 6'
In the following part of this Article, these issues will be
examined and addressed under the relevant WTO treaties and case
law. The issues discussed below are not intended to be exhaustive
with respect to the dispute between the United States and China.
III. Issues Relating to GATT Article I
A. An Overview of GATT Article I
Article I of GATT imposes obligations on WTO Members to
extend most-favored nation ("MFN") treatment to other Members
of the organization in the course of trade in goods.62 Subject to a
few exceptions, the MFN obligation under GATT Article I
requires a WTO Member to treat activities of a particular foreign
country or its citizens at least as favorably as it treats the activities
of any other country.63 In the language of Article I itself, the MFN
treatment requires that "any advantage, favor, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in
60 Id.
61 Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432
[hereinafter Protocol], available at http://upanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/APCITYJUNPAN002123.pdf (Nov. 10, 2001). The consistency between the
VAT rebate programs and the Protocol should be incorporated in other issues with
regard to the consistency with Articles I and III of GATT because the VAT rebate
programs with respect to the IC industry are not specifically mentioned in the Protocol.
Id. Rather, the Protocol merely contains a general provision on China's VAT system
(Section 11.2), which provides that "China shall ensure that internal taxes and charges,
including value-added taxes, applied or administered by national or sub-national
authorities shall be in conformity with the GATT 1994." Id. Therefore, it is conceivable
that if the IC VAT rebate programs are in compliance with GATT, then there should be
no issue of a violation of the Protocol here. Id.
62 See GATT, supra note 56, art. I.
63 Id.
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or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties."'
The fundamental principle embedded in Article I of GATT is
nondiscrimination, which has been central to the post-World War
II international trading system.65 As the Appellate Body stated in
its report on Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry ("Canada - Autos"),66 the object and purpose of Article I
is to "prohibit discrimination among like products originating in or
destined for different countries," and serve as "an incentive for
concessions, negotiated reciprocally, to be extended to all other
Members on an MFN basis. 67
B. The U.S. Challenge to China's IC-Related VAT Policies
Under GATT Article I
It is apparent from the Request for Consultation submitted by
the United States, as quoted below, that China's VAT incentive
programs concerning importation of chips designed in China is the
target of the attack in connection with GATT Article 1:68 "[W]e
understand that China allows for a partial refund of VAT for
domestically-designed ICs that, because of technological
limitations, are manufactured outside of China. China thus
appears to be providing for more favorable treatment of imports
from one Member than another .... 6 9
The following hypothesis illustrates the MFN issue raised by
the United States: if a Chinese IC chip designer designs a type of
chip and then has it fabricated in Japan, the importer of such chips
from Japan, subject to certification by the Chinese government,
can enjoy a partial VAT rebate. But, if the United States is
exporting the same type of chip to China and such U.S. fabricated
chips are not designed in China, there would be no VAT rebate
64 Id.
65 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 68 (2000).
66 Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WTO Doc.
WT/DS 139, 142/AB/R (May 1, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-Autos (Appellate Body)].
67 Id. para. 84.
68 On the other hand, at least on the face of the VAT rebate program for domestic
IC fabricators, there is no appearance of any favorable treatment to any specific IC
exporting country. As discussed infra, the VAT rebate programs for China's domestic
IC fabricators are more inclined to be charged for violation of Article III of GATT.
69 Request for Consultation, supra note 59 (emphasis added).
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available for U.S. chip importers. Therefore, U.S. fabricated chips
are discriminated against in comparison to the hypothesized
Japanese chips.
C. Discussion of China's VAT Rebate Programs for
Domestically Designed ICs Under GATT Article I
1. Order of Examination
In the WTO Panel Report on Indonesia - Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry ("Indonesia - Autos"),70 the
Panel set forth a framework for examining a measure challenged
pursuant to Article I of GATT:
The Appellate Body, in Bananas III, confirmed that to establish
a violation of Article I, there must be an advantage of the type
covered by Article I and which is not accorded unconditionally
to all "like products" of all WTO Members. Following this
analysis, we shall first examine whether the tax and customs
duty benefits are advantages of the types covered by Article I.
Second, we shall decide whether the advantages are offered (i)
to all like products and (ii) unconditionally. 71
The following discussion of China's VAT rebate for imported
ICs designed in China observes this sequence.
2. Advantages Covered by Article I
There are essentially two types of advantages conferred by the
Chinese government in connection with IC chips designed in
China but fabricated overseas: i) exemption from tariffs and ii) the
rebate of VAT collected upon an import in excess of 6%.72 Since
China is a signatory of the Agreement on the Implementation of
the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology
Products73 ("ITA"), which requires the elimination of tariffs
70 Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO Doc.
DS54, 55, 59, 64/R (July 2, 1998) [hereinafter Indonesia -Autos].
71 Id. para. 14.138.
72 Circular No. 25, supra note 36, art. 5(2).
73 Agreement on the Implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in
Information Technology Products, Dec. 1996, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/inftece/inftece.htm.
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imposed on information technology products, the tariff rate for IC
chips74 imposed by the Chinese government should be 0% for
products imported from WTO Member States. Therefore, the
tariff exemption policy for imported IC chips designed in China
would be unlikely to raise any MFN concerns before the WTO
tribunal. The remaining contentious advantage, challenged by the
United States as a violation of GATT Article I, appears to be the
VAT rebate program for imported ICs.
The advantages referred to in Article I of GATT are not
limited to custom duties. A VAT imposed on imported products,
which is usually paid by the importers, does seem to fall into the
broad language of Article I, which encompasses "charges of any
kind imposed on or in connection with importation or
exportation," and "any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity."7 " In fact, VAT for imported goods is typically
collected, together with tariffs, by China's customs authorities on
behalf of the tax authorities.7 6
Yet, on closer examination of this policy, the notion of an
"advantage" might be clouded by the "rebate" feature as provided
in Circular No. 140. Based on a literal reading of Article 1 of
Circular No. 140, the theoretical VAT rate applicable to all
imported IC chips, no matter where they are designed, is
universally 17%. 77 Circular No. 140 requires that Chinese tax
authorities immediately rebate any VAT levied in excess of 6% to
domestic taxpayers, who are ordinarily Chinese IC chip importers,
after the chips are imported.78 Consequently, China could have
argued that its VAT rebate program for imported IC chips is a type
of subsidy conferred on domestic IC chip importers rather than an
"advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" granted to the IC chip
as a "product" under Article I of GATT. 79  The "subsidy"
conferred here is contingent on a Chinese domestic importer's
importation of IC chips that are designed in China and are
74 IC is a type of information technology product covered under the schedules of
the ITA. See id. at Section 1 of Attachment A.
75 GATT, supra note 56, art. I.
76 GENSLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 146 (Art. 20 of the VAT Regulations).
77 See Circular No. 140, supra note 52, art. 1.
78 See id.
79 GATT, supra note 56, art. I.
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calculated based on 11% (the difference between the 17%
mandatory VAT rate and the 6% rebate limit) of the import
value.8° By asserting this argument, China might be able to divert
the scrutiny of this policy from Article I of GATT to the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures8' ("SCM
Agreement") of the WTO.82
A counterargument that may be relied upon is the Panel's
ruling in the Indonesia - Autos case in response to Indonesia's
claim of the exclusive application of the SCM Agreement with
regard to its sales tax and customs duty exemptions in the
contested program.83 The Panel stated:
We have already discussed in Section C above why we consider
that the SCM Agreement is not generally the only relevant and
applicable agreement to the measures under examination. We
found that the obligations contained in the WTO Agreement are
generally cumulative and can be complied with simultaneously.
We shall, therefore, now proceed to the examination of the
claims of the complainants that aspects of the Indonesian car
programmes violate the MFN obligations of Article I of
GATT.84
The customs duty benefits of the various Indonesian car
programmes are explicitly covered by the wording of Article I.
As to the tax benefits of these programmes, we note that Article
1:1 refers explicitly to "all matters referred to in paragraphs 2
and 4 of Article II". We have already decided that the tax
discrimination aspects of the National Car programme were
matters covered by Article 111:2 of GATT. Therefore, the
customs duty and tax advantages of the February and June 1996
80 Id.
81 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 1, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
82 Under the SCM Agreement, such a subsidy, contingent on importation of
products, is not necessarily prohibited. Id. For further discussion of the IC VAT rebate
programs as a type of subsidy, refer infra to Part VI of this Article.
83 Indonesia - Autos, supra note 70, paras. 14.123-125.
84 Id. para. 14.131 (emphasis added).
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car programmes are of the type covered by Article I of GA7T.85
While utilizing this counterargument, particular attention must
be paid to two important facets upon which Indonesia -Autos was
premised when bringing Indonesia's car programs under the
scrutiny of Article I. First, the "customs duty benefits" were
"explicitly covered by the wording of Article 1.,, 86  Second,
Indonesia's car program was determined to have been "covered by
Article 111:2 of GATT. 87  Such premises are not necessarily
discemable in China's IC-related VAT rebate programs because
the word "rebate" is not explicitly stipulated in Article I, and it is
highly debatable whether the programs are covered by paragraphs
2 or 4 of GATT Article 111.88 Therefore, conceptually, there
should be considerable room for China to distinguish the
mechanism of "rebate of already collected tax" from a tax
exemption program, which was struck down by the Panel of
Indonesia - Autos and the Appellate Body of Canada - Autos as a
violation of GATT Article 1.89 Indeed, the author of this Article is
unaware of any WTO Panel or Appellate Body jurisprudence
examining a "tax rebate" program under Article I of GATT.
3. Like Products
It is hard to envisage any material dispute between China and
the United States on the issue of likeness with respect to the
imported IC products. The United States could probably establish
the fact that IC chips designed in China and IC chips designed
elsewhere have the same structures, characters, functions, end-
users, and even tariff classifications. Examined in the light of
GATT Article I, it would be difficult for China to argue that IC
chips designed in China are not like products of IC chips designed
elsewhere, if other characteristics of such products are "like." To
be sure, the distinguishing of like products provided in Article I
85 Id. para. 14.139 (emphasis added).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 The VAT rebate policy for imported chips designed in China was, until now, not
challenged by the United States under Article 1H. See infra Part IV.B. Furthermore, as
Part IV.C. I will discuss, given the provisions of Article 111:8(b) of GATT, arts. 111:2 or
111:4 might not be applicable here. See infra Part IV.C.l.
89 See Indonesia - Autos, supra note 70, para 15.1(c); Canada - Autos (Appellate
Body), supra note 66, para. 86.
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based on the method or history of production was expressly
objected by a 1981 GATT Panel Report on Spain - Tariff
Treatment of Unroasted Coffee:90
The Panel examined all arguments that had been advanced
during the proceedings for the justification of a different tariff
treatment for various groups and types of unroasted coffee. It
noted that these arguments mainly related to organoleptic
differences resulting from geographical factors, cultivation
methods, the processing of the beans, and the genetic factor.
The Panel did not consider that such differences were sufficient
reason to allow for a different tariff treatment. It pointed out
that it was not unusual in the case of agricultural products that
the taste and aroma of the end-product would differ because of
one or several of the above-mentioned factors.
In light of the foregoing, the Panel concluded that unroasted,
non-decaffeinated coffee beans listed in the Spanish Customs
Tariff... should be considered as like products within the
meaning of Article 1: 1.91
Nevertheless, China might want to pay close attention to the
products included in the complaint by the United States and try to
single out those "directly competitive or substitutable products"
mingled in the allegations as "like products" under Article I so as
to mitigate the disadvantageous position on this point. China
might be able to rely on a 1978 GATT Panel Report on EEC -
Measures on Animal Feed Proteins for authority.92 This document
supports a narrow reading of the phrase "like products" in GATT
Article I: "The Panel noted that the general most-favoured-nation
treatment provided for in Article 1: 1 ... did not mention directly
competitive or substitutable products. In this regard the Panel did
not consider animal, marine and synthetic proteins to be products
like those vegetable proteins covered by the measures."93
90 Spain - Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, WTO Doc. L/5135-28S/102 (June
11, 1981).
91 Id. paras. 4.6, 4.9 (emphasis added).
92 EEC - Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, VTO Doc. [14599-25S/49 (Mar. 14,
1978).
93 Id. para. 4.20.
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The Appellate Body has pointed out in its Report on Japan -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages ("Japan - Alcohol")94 that
determination of both "like products" and "directly competitive
and substitutable products" warrants case-by-case study.95 The
distinguishing of "like products" from the wider category of
"directly competitive and substitutable products" is presumably
also decided on a case-by-case basis pursuant to the products'
physical characteristics, common end-users, tariff classifications,
and the "market place" (including the elasticity of substitution
between products).96
4. Origin Specificity and Unconditional Application
The next issue that would need to be discussed by the WTO
tribunal in connection with an Article I violation is whether the
"advantage" is granted to "any products originating in or destined
for any other country," and, if so, whether such an advantage is
"accorded immediately and unconditionally" to the like products
of all other WTO members.97
In this connection, China could probably make a persuasive
argument that the IC rebate policy under the scrutiny of Article 1: 1
is completely origin-neutral rather than country-specific. Hence,
the favorable tax treatment is granted to "some products" (IC chips
designed in China) originating in all Members of the WTO rather
than "any products originating from a specific country." In
addition, China might argue that although the application of such
preferential tax treatment is conditioned on where the chips are
designed, such a condition is equally applicable to every Member
of the WTO. In this sense, the application of the "conditional tax
treatment" is unconditional.
Indeed, China's VAT rebate program conditioned on the
designer of IC chips involves the contentious issue of
discrimination based on processes and production methods
("PPMs") and its compatibility with Article I of GATT. A literal
reading of GATT Article I: 1 seems to suggest that discrimination
94 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8,10,11 /AB/R (Oct.
4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan -Alcohol].
95 See id. at 19-21.
96 See id. at 25.
97 See GATT, supra note 56, art. : 1.
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against imported products based on their PPMs is not per se
illegal. In other words, the U.S. challenge to this origin-neutral
policy carried out by China is not textually supported by Article I.
Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO appears to
have explored this issue further.
In one of the earliest GATT decisions, Belgian Family
Allowances, 8 a Panel considered whether Belgium's levying of a
non-product-related PPM tax on imported goods from other
countries had violated GATT Article I.99 The Panel reasoned that
the nature of an exporting country's family allowance program
was "irrelevant" to GATT Article I, which does not permit
discrimination depending on conditions,' 0 and so the Panel struck
down the Belgium tax policy.10 ' The Panel stated in its report that
Article I required Belgium to grant the exemption to every other
GATT party regardless of whether a government qualified for the
exemption by having a similar family allowance program.10 2
Among the dispute settlement reports in the WTO era, there
are two cases litigating the PPM tax programs vis-ei-vis GATT
Article I, namely Indonesia - Autos and Canada - Autos. Both of
the Indonesian and Canadian PPM-based tax programs were struck
down by their corresponding WTO adjudicators."°3
The PPM-based tax programs challenged in Indonesia - Autos
concerned the exemption of customs duties and sales taxes on
imported products when the exporting manufacturer utilizes a
sufficient amount of Indonesian parts or labor.' °4 According to the
Panel, GATT case law made clear that any advantage "cannot be
made conditional on any criteria that is [sic] not related to the
imported products itself."'0 5 Based upon this premise, the Panel
98 Belgian Family Allowances, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 59 (Nov. 7, 1952).
99 Id. para. 1.
100 Id. para. 3.
101 Id. para. 5.
102 Id. paras. 3, 6.
103 See Indonesia -Autos, supra note 70, para. 15.1(a); Canada - Certain Measures
Affecting the Automotive Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS139, 142/R (Feb. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter Canada-Autos (Panel Report)].
104 Indonesia - Autos, supra note 70, paras. 2.17-18, 2.27-28.
105 Id. para. 14.143.
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reasoned:
Indeed, it appears that the design and structure of the June 1996
car programme is such as to allow situations where another
Member's like product to a National Car imported by PT PTN
from Korea will be subject to much higher duties and sales taxes
than those imposed on such National Cars. For example,
customs duties as high as 200% can be imposed on finished
motor vehicles while an imported National Car benefits from a
0% customs duty. No taxes are imposed on a National Car
while an imported like motor vehicle from another Member
would be subject to a 35% sales tax. The distinction as to
whether one product is subject to 0% duty and the other one is
subject to 200% duty or whether one product is subject to 0%
sales tax and the other one is subject to a 35% sales tax, depends
on whether or not PT TPN had made a "deal" with that
exporting company to produce that National Car, and is covered
by the authorization of June 1996 with specifications that
correspond to those of the Kia car produced only in Korea. In
the GATT/WTO, the right of Members cannot be made
dependent upon, conditional on or even affected by, any private
contractual obligations in place. The existence of these
conditions is inconsistent with the provisions of Article 1:1,
which provides that tax and customs duty benefits accorded to
products of one Member (here on Korean products) be accorded
to imported like products from other Members "immediately and
unconditionally." 10 6
It is interesting to note that, although the Panel of Indonesia -
Autos stressed the relationship between the "criteria" and the
"product itself," what the Panel really relied on is the origin
specificity feature (the de facto discrimination effect of the autos
from Korea and autos from other countries) of the criteria and the
effect thereof.'07
In the Canada - Autos case, the Panel adopted a more nuanced
interpretation of Article I with regard to PPM-based
discriminations. The Panel opined that "the fact that conditions
attached to such an advantage are not related to the import itself
does not necessarily imply that such conditions are discriminatory
106 Id. para. 14.145 (footnote omitted).
107 Id.
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with respect to the origin of imported products." '  Therefore,
contrary to the reasoning of the Panel of Indonesia - Autos, the
Panel of Canada - Autos ruled that Canada's import duty
exemption "cannot be held to be inconsistent with Article 1:1
simply on the grounds that it is granted on conditions that are not
related to the imported products themselves."''0 9  Rather, the
adjudicator must determine "whether these conditions amount to
discrimination between like products of different origins."" The
Panel later found that Canada's tax exemption was origin-specific
and concluded that Article : 1 was violated on that ground.
On appeal, the findings of the Panel of Canada - Autos were
upheld by the Appellate Body on the ground of de facto
discrimination."' The interpreting methodology of the Panel in
the preceding paragraph was not addressed by the Appellate Body.
While addressing de facto discrimination prohibited under
Article : 1, the Appellate Body pointed out that the text of the
provision is in no way limited to "on its face" or "de jure"
discrimination.12  The broad application of Article 1:1 applies to
"any advantage," not just to "some advantage;" to "any product,"
not just to "some products;" and to the like products originating in
"all other" Members, not just to the like products from "some"
108 Canada -Autos (Appellate Body), supra note 66, para. 10.24.
109 Canada -Autos (Panel Report), supra note 103, para. 10.30 (emphasis added).
110 Id.
I The Appellate Body first observed that although the measures impose no formal
restriction on the origin of the imported motor vehicles that are eligible to receive the
import duty exemption, in practice the major automotive firms in Canada import only
their own make of motor vehicles and those of related companies. Canada - Autos
(Appellate Body), supra note 66, para. 10.24). As such, the Appellate Body remarked:
[T]hese privileged motor vehicles are imported by a limited number of
designated manufacturers who are required to meet certain performance
conditions. In practice, this measure does not accord the same import duty
exemption immediately and unconditionally to like motor vehicles of all other
Members, as required under Article 1:1 of the GATT 1994. The advantage of
the import duty exemption is accorded to some motor vehicles originating in
certain countries without being accorded to like motor vehicles from all other
Members.
Id. para. 85 (emphasis in original).
112 Id. para. 78.
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other Members.' 13  Further, the Appellate Body recalled the
Panel's finding that, in practice, the duty exemption is granted to
imports from only a small number of countries in which the
exporters are affiliated with eligible Canadian
manufacturers/importers. "4 Thus, considering both the text of
Article 1:1 and the Panel's conclusions about the "practical
operation of the measure," the Appellate Body concluded that
Canada had acted inconsistently with GATT Article 1:1 by
granting an "advantage" to some products from some Members, so
that Canada has not "accorded immediately and unconditionally"
to "like" products "originating in or destined for the territories of
all other Members."' 15
The jurisprudence of the WTO summarized above appears to
reveal the rule that a PPM-based, origin-neutral policy can only be
a violation of Article 1:1 when it is found to be a de facto
discrimination based on the product's origin. To establish a de
facto discrimination that violates GATT Article I, the trading
effect of such a policy must be examined and the adjudicators
must find discriminating results from such effect.
Applying such rules to the case at hand, the United States
might find it hard to establish the discriminatory trading effect.
Statistics could have revealed that the United States is currently
the largest exporter of IC chips to China.
IV. Issues Relating to GATT Article III
A. An Overview of GAIT Article III
The national treatment obligation as embodied in Article III of
GATT is another form of non-discrimination requirement. It
mandates that a nation must treat within its own borders the goods,
services, and persons originating from outside its border in the
same manner as it treats those which are of domestic origin."16
Obviously, an important policy behind this rule is to prevent
domestic tax and regulatory policies from being used as
protectionist measures that would defeat the purpose of tariff
"13 Id. para. 79.
114 Id. para. 80.
"15 Id. paras. 79, 80.
116 GATT, supra note 56, art. III.
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bindings." 7 This goal is constantly reaffirmed by the WTO
adjudicating body in their dispute settlement reports. For
example, in the Appellate Body Report on Japan - Alcohol, the
purpose of GATT Article III was explained in the following terms:
The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid
protectionism in the application of internal tax and regulatory
measures. More specifically, the purpose of Article III is to
ensure that internal measures "not be applied to imported or
domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production." Toward this end, Article III obliges Members of
the WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for
imported products in relation to domestic products. The
intention of the drafters of the Agreement was clearly to treat the
imported products in the same way as the like domestic products
once they had been cleared through customs. Otherwise indirect
protection could be given. 18
The first paragraph of GATT Article III is a statement of
general policy that sets out the national treatment obligation
pertaining to the treatment of imported products."19 It contains a
phrase obligating contracting parties to avoid using taxes or
regulations "so as to afford protection to domestic production."'
' 20
The second paragraph of Article III requires that internal taxes
on imported products shall not exceed those applied to domestic
goods and expressly refers to the general goal of paragraph 1.121
Specifically, the two sentences in Article 111:2 distinguish between
two different types of products when a Member is granting
national treatment: like products 22 and directly competitive and
117 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM - LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 189 (1989).
118 Japan -Alcohol, supra note 94, at 16 (footnotes omitted).
119 GATI', supra note 56, art. 111:1.
120 Id.
121 Id. art. 111:2.
122 The first sentence of Article 111:2 reads in its entirety: "[T]he products of the
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges
of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like products." Id.
(emphasis added.)
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substitutable products. 123  According to such a distinction, a
complaining party alleging a violation of Article 111:2 has two
possible avenues. One is to'establish that (i) the domestic and the
imported products are like products and (ii) the latter products are
taxed in excess of the former. The second avenue is to establish
that (i) the domestic and the imported products are directly
competitive and substitutable products; (ii) the two products are
not similarly taxed; and (iii) the dissimilar taxation operates so as
to afford protection to domestic production.
The fourth paragraph of Article III imposes essentially the
same obligation with respect to regulations and other requirements
affecting the internal sale of imported products (other than tax
treatments). 124 Paragraphs 5 and 7 of Article III prohibit the use of
mixing requirements to favor domestic products.
25
The rest of the paragraphs of Article III provide for a series of
exceptions to the application of general national treatment.
126
Among these exceptions, the most relevant one to the dispute
discussed in this Article lies in Article 111:8(b), which provides:
"[T]he provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of
subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments
to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes
or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article
and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of
domestic products."''
27
123 The second sentence of Article 111:2 reads in its entirety: "[Mioreover, no
contracting party shall other apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1." Id.
The Ad Note of Article 111:2 further explains the second sentence of this paragraph and
the relations between the two sentences in the following terms:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would
be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only
in cases where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed
product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product
which was not similarly taxed.
Id. (emphasis added).
124 Id. art. 111:4.
125 Id. art. 111:5, 7.
126 Id. art. 111:8-10.
127 Id. art. III:8(b).
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B. The U.S. Challenge to China's IC-Related VAT Programs
Under GATT Article III
In the oversimplified Request for Consultations submitted by
the United States in connection with China's VAT on ICs, the
charge with respect to China's violation of GATT Article III was
as follows:
China provides for a 17 percent VAT on ICs. However, we
understand that enterprises in China are entitled to a partial
refund of the VAT on ICs that they have produced, resulting in a
lower VAT rate on their products. China therefore appears to be
subjecting imported ICs to higher taxes than applied to domestic
ICs and to be according less favourable treatment to imported
ICs. 128
C. Discussion of China's VAT Rebate Programs for IC
Fabricators Under GATTArticle III
1. Article III.8(b) and the Applicability of Article III
Before examining the substantive issues pertaining to the
national treatment obligations mandated under Article III of
GATT, a threshold question is whether Article III should apply at
all in this case. Again, a plain reading of the provisions in
Circulars Nos. 18, 25, and 70 suggests that the VAT rebate
programs implemented therein are highly likely to be "the
payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including
payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of
internal taxes or charges"'29 as provided in the Article 111:8(b)
exception.13 ° Indeed, China probably could use the same argument
as discussed in Part III.C, supra, to distinguish between the notion
of a "tax revenue rebate" and the concept of "tax exemption" or
"tax discrimination." Consequently, it is entirely possible that the
WTO adjudicator would read China's VAT rebate programs for IC
128 Request for Consultation, supra note 59 (emphasis added). Hence, it is apparent
that the target policy of this charge is China's VAT rebate program for domestic IC
fabricators as introduced in Part II.A of this Article.
129 See Circular No. 18, supra note 8; Circular No. 25, supra note 36; and Circular
No. 70, supra note 45.
130 GATT, supra note 56, art. III:8(b).
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fabricators as a type of subsidy, which is explicitly exempted from
the application of the national treatment obligation in Article III of
GATT.
Nevertheless, a review of the relevant GATT and WTO
jurisprudence indicates that the granting of subsidies, in the usual
sense, does not automatically furnish a safe harbor for the measure
to avoid scrutiny for the applicability of the national treatment
obligations under Article III. As the discussion below
demonstrates, most of the cases in the history of GATT/WTO
jurisprudence have subscribed to a fairly narrow reading of the
word "subsidy," and the DSB has struck down almost all of the
assertions of the Article 111:8(b) exemption invoked by the
countries providing the "subsidies." Hence, a more thorough
analysis of the pertinent regulations is warranted, and a number of
qualifiers to the "subsidy" is indispensable to establish an Article
111:8(b) exemption.
In the WTO era, the two cases analyzing the Article III:8(b)
exemption are Canada - Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals3' ("Canada - Periodicals") and Indonesia - Autos.
Neither Canada132 nor Indonesia'33 succeeded in invoking the
Article 111:8(b) exemption to protect their "subsidy" programs
from national treatment scrutiny.
In the Canada - Periodicals dispute, one of the measures at
issue related to postal rates charged by the Canadian Post
Corporation, a Crown Corporation controlled by the Canadian
government.'34  Canada Post applied reduced postal rates to
Canadian-owned and Canadian-controlled periodicals meeting
certain requirements. 35 These lower postal rates were funded by
the Department of Canadian Heritage, which provided funds to
Canada Post so that this agency could, in turn, offer the reduced
postal rates to eligible Canadian periodicals. 136 Canada argued that
131 WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, WTO Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R, (June 30, 1997) [hereinafter Canada-
Periodicals].
132 Id. para. 35.
133 Indonesia -Autos, supra note 70, para. 14.122.
134 Canada - Periodicals, supra note 131, at 35.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 32.
[Vol. 30
A DEFENSELESS POLICY?
the reduced postal rate was exempted from the structures of
Article 111:4 by virtue of Article III:8(b) because the reduced
postal rate represented "payment of subsidies exclusively to
domestic producers."' 37 The Panel agreed with Canada and found
that the funds provided by the Department of Canadian Heritage
passed through Canada Post directly to the eligible Canadian
publishers and that, therefore, Canada's funded rate scheme on
periodicals qualified under Article 111:8(b).' 38 The Appellate Body
subsequently reversed the Panel's finding and found that Article
111:8(b) applied only to the payment of subsidies which involves
the expenditure of revenue by a government:
In examining the text of Article m:8(b), we believe that the
phrase, "including payments to domestic producers derived from
the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently
with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through
governmental purchases of domestic products" helps to
elucidate the types of subsidies covered by Article III:8(b) of the
GATT 1994. It is not an exhaustive list of the kinds of
programmes that would qualify as 'the payment of subsidies
exclusively to domestic producers', but those words exemplify
the kinds of programmes which are exempted from the
obligations of Articles 111:2 and 111:4 of the GATT 1994.
Our textual interpretation is supported by the context of Article
111:8(b) examined in relation to Articles 111:2 and 111:4 of the
GATT 1994. Furthermore, the object and purpose of Article
111:8(b) is confirmed by the drafting history of Article III. In
this context, we refer to the following discussion in the Reports
of the Committees and Principal Sub-Committees of the Interim
Commission for the International Trade Organization
concerning the provision of the Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization that corresponds to Article
111:8(b) of the GATT 1994:
This sub-paragraph was redrafted in order to make it clear
that nothing in Article 18 could be construed to sanction the
exemption of domestic products from internal taxes imposed
on like imported products or the remission of such taxes. At
the same time the Sub-Committee recorded its view that
137 Id. at 7.
138 Id.
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nothing in this sub-paragraph or elsewhere in Article 18
would override the provisions of Section C of Chapter IV.
We do not see a reason to distinguish a reduction of tax rates on
a product from a reduction in transportation or postal rates.
Indeed, an examination of the text, context, and object and
purpose of Article Im:8(b) suggests that it was intended to
exempt from the obligations of Article III only the payment of
subsidies which involves the expenditure of revenue by a
government.
39
In Indonesia - Autos, the Panel examined certain tax
exemptions for domestically produced automobiles and rejected
Indonesia's assertion of an Article III:8(b) exemption on similar
grounds:
We consider that the purpose of Article lml:8(b) is to confirm
that subsidies to producers do not violate Article III, so long as
they do not have any component that introduces discrimination
between imported and domestic products. In our view the
wording "payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic
producers' exists so as to ensure that only subsidies provided to
producers, and not tax or other forms of discrimination on
products, be considered subsidies for the purpose of Article
111:8(b) of GATT. This is in line with previous GATT panels
and WTO Appellate Body reports.
We recall also that the type of interpretation sought by Indonesia
was explicitly excluded by the drafters of Article 111:8(b) when
they rejected a proposal by Cuba at the Havana Conference to
amend the Article so as to read:
The provisions of this Article shall not preclude the
exemption of domestic products from internal taxes as a
means of indirect subsidization in the cases covered under
Article [XVI].
The arguments submitted by Indonesia that its measures are only
governed by the SCM Agreement clearly do not find any
support in the wording of Article 11:8(b) of GATT. On the
contrary, Article 11:8(b) confirms that the obligations of Article
HI and those of Article XVI (and the SCM Agreement) are
different and complementary: subsidies to producers are subject
to the national treatment provisions of Article I when they
139 Id. at 33-34.
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discriminate between imported and domestic products.1
40
During the GATT era, the invocation of the Article I1I:8(b)
exception was struck down on three out of four occasions.14 1 The
only challenge that withstood scrutiny is contained in the Panel
Report of United States - Measures Affecting the Importation,
Internal Sales and Use of Tobacco ("U.S. - Tobacco").142 In this
case, the Panel examined a claim regarding the No Net Cost
Assessment ("NNCA") levied on domestic and imported tobacco,
the proceeds of which were deposited in an account used to
reimburse the U.S. Government for any losses resulting from the
domestic tobacco price-support program. 143  The Panel
distinguished the NNCA program from previous cases and
reasoned:
The Panel was cognizant of the fact that a remission of a tax on
a product and the payment of a producer subsidy out of the
proceeds of such a tax could have the same economic effects.
However, the Panel noted that the distinction in Article Im:8(b)
is a formal one, not one related to the economic impact of a
measure. Thus, in view of the explicit language of Article
111:8(b), which recognizes that the product-related rules of
Article IH "shall not prevent the payment of subsidies
exclusively to domestic producers", the Panel did not consider,
as argued by the complainants, that the payment of a subsidy to
tobacco producers out of the proceeds of the NNCA resulted in a
form of tax remission inconsistent with Article 111:2.
140 Indonesia -Autos, supra note 70, para. 14.43-14.45 (footnotes omitted).
141 Panel Reports on Italian Discrimination Against Agriculture Machinery (GATT
Doc. L/833, adopted on Oct. 23, 1958, B.I.S.D. 7S/60), European Economic Community
- Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related
Animal-Feed Proteins (GATT Doc. L/6627, adopted on Jan. 25, 1990, B.I.S.D. 37S/86),
United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (GATT Doc. DS23/R,
adopted on June 19, 1992, B.I.S.D. 39S/206).
For the reasoning of the GATT Panels in striking down these Article III:8(b) exceptions
in these cases, see WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT
LAW AND PRACTICE 194-96 (1995).
142 WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States - Measures Affecting the
Importation, Internal Sales and Use of Tobacco, WTO Doc. DS44/R (Oct. 4, 1994)
(hereinafter U.S. - Tobacco].
143 Id. para. 10.
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The Panel then considered the complainants' claim that the
NNCA was inconsistent with Article 111:2, second sentence,
because the NNCAs charged on imported tobacco reduced the
cost of the price support programme to the domestic tobacco
producer, without providing any benefit to imported tobacco.
The Panel did not consider that it needed to examine this claim
in view of the fact that Article 111:8(b), which explicitly
recognizes that subsidies to domestic producers are not subject
to the national treatment rules of Article III, applies to all
provisions of Article Ill, including that of Article 1:2, second
sentence. 144
The rule one can summarize from these cases is that a tax
exemption or reduction available exclusively to domestic
producers would not trigger the Article I11:8(b) exemption. The
direct payment of tax revenues derived from a tax applied equally
and exclusively to domestic producers qualifies, however, as an
Article 111:8(b) exemption and, thus, escapes from the national
treatment obligation provided for in the remaining paragraphs of
Article III.
Given its "payment" nature, China's VAT rebate programs for
IC fabricators more closely resemble the NNCA program in the
U.S. - Tobacco case rather than the tax exemption or reduction
cases of Canada - Periodicals and Indonesia - Autos. Therefore,
China should have a strong legal basis to invoke the Article
111:8(b) exemption and argue that the national treatment
obligations in Articles 111:2 and 111:4 do not apply.
A counterargument that the United States might be able to
raise is that, even though the VAT rebate program is literally
worded as an "immediate payment" to domestic IC fabricators
from the already collected VAT revenues, Chinese government
authorities are not, in fact, implementing the regulations in that
manner. Given the loosely drafted government documents and the
lack of coherence with respect to tax law enforcement among the
local tax bureaus throughout China, it would not be impossible for
the United States to find a few manufacturers who are
administratively collecting VAT from local IC fabricators
according to the "effective tax burden rate" (3%) instead of
rebating the tax revenue to such companies after VAT
144 Id. paras. 109, 111 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 30
A DEFENSELESS POLICY?
collection. 45  Based on such evidence, the United States could
argue that despite the fact that the language in the relevant
government documents may fulfill the standards for invoking the
Article III:8(b) exception, government enforcement of such
legislation at certain local levels has factually negated the
"payment" nature as required under Article III:8(b). Therefore,
the program as a whole, including its local implementation, should
be brought under the purview of Article HI.
This counterargument involves the vexing issue of what
constitutes "measures" challengeable under Articles 3.3, 3.7, 4.2,
and 6.2 of the DSU. Generally speaking, the term "measure" is
broad enough to encompass legislation, regulations, administrative
guidelines, and administrative behaviors.1 46 Therefore, a local tax
bureau's disregard for the central government's regulation and the
direct application of discriminatory VAT rates to domestic and
foreign IC fabricators could be regarded as government behavior
and, thus, be challenged as a "measure" under the DSU.147 Efforts
to exclude the local government agencies' law enforcement from a
Panel's review because such "measures" are not included in the
Request for Consultations or Request for the Establishment of a
Panel by the United States will likely be unhelpful in this regard.
The Panel Report on Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper48 ("Japan - Film") set the
precedent that a measure not "explicitly described" in the panel
request could still be reviewed by the WTO adjudicating body as
long as it is "subsidiary or so closely related to a 'measure'
145 For a general discussion on China's legislative process and law enforcement, see
Peter Howard Come, Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
369 (2002).
146 See JEFF WAINCYMER, WTO LITIGATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FORMAL
DisPuE SETTLEMENT 136-37 (2002).
147 One of the cases decided by the DSB that appears to support this position is
European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WTO
Doc. WT/DS62, 67, 68/AB/R [hereinafter EC - Computer Equipment]. The Appellate
Body Report on EC - Computer Equipment opined that not only measures of general
application but also the application of tariffs by customs authorities were "measures"
within the meaning of Article 6.2 of the DSU. Id. para. 65.
148 WTO Dispute Panel Report on Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper, WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter
Japan - Film].
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specifically identified, that the responding party can reasonably be
found to have received adequate notice of the scope of the claims
asserted by the complaining party."'149 Local implementation of
the VAT rebate programs is clearly "subsidiary" or "closely
related to" the measure challenged by the United States in this
case.
In light of such a possibility, an examination of the VAT
rebate programs for IC fabricators under the remaining provisions
of GATT Article III still appears to be necessary in order to see
the array of arguments on both sides of the case.
2. Violation of Article 111:2
Since the VAT rebate program for domestic IC fabricators is a
fiscal measure, there should be no doubt that the applicable
provision in Article III is paragraph 2 rather than paragraph 4.150
As described above, the two sentences of Article 111:2 govern two
types of foreign products, "like products" and "directly
competitive and substitutable products," and impose different
levels of scrutiny on challenged tax treatments, taxed "in excess
of" and "not similarly taxed".. t The following discussion will
examine China's pertinent VAT rebate programs under both of
these sentences.
a. The First Sentence of Article 111:2
As mentioned above, the two-tiered test to establish a violation
of the first sentence of Article 111:2 is (i) the domestic and foreign
products are like products and (ii) the latter is taxed in excess of
the former.'52 It is well settled that the complainant bears the
burden of proof for both tests.153
Similar to the situation under the review of GATT Article I,
1
'
4
149 Id. para. 10.8.
150 As discussed supra, the measures governed by GATT Article 111:4 are "law,
regulations, or requirement affecting [the imported like products'] internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use." See Part IV.A of this Article,
supra. Tax policies and measures are generally examined under GATT Article 11:2.
151 GATT, supra note 56, art. 111:2
152 See Canada - Periodicals, supra note 131, at 22.
153 Japan - Alcohol, supra note 94, para. 6.14.
154 For a discussion of like products under GATT art. I, see supra Part II.C.3.
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it would be extremely difficult for China to distinguish the
domestically fabricated ICs, enjoying the VAT rebate, from
imported ICs and argue that they are not like products.
Nonetheless, in determining the likeness of the IC products in
dispute, it is worth noting that the WTO adjudicating body is
subscribing to a narrow reading of the word "like" and has
stressed that it should be determined on a case-by-case basis.'55
Moreover, the Japan - Alcohol Panel also recognized that a
sufficiently detailed tariff classification can be a helpful sign of the
likeness of domestic and imported products.'56
The more troublesome issue lies in the second part of the first
sentence of Article 111:2: whether the imported ICs are taxed "in
excess of' the domestically fabricated ICs? Again, China would
still seem to be able to utilize the "rebate" nature of the programs
and argue that, given the identical 17% VAT rate applicable to
both domestically fabricated ICs and imported like ICs, the latter
is not taxed "in excess of' the former. The key feature of this
program is that the two types of ICs are dissimilarly "rebated" as
opposed to "unequally taxed."'57 It naturally follows that, since a
"rebate" is not within the ordinary meaning of the term "taxes or
other internal charges," the second test is not satisfied here.
In response, the United States could raise three points to rebut
this argument. First, according to the Panel Report on Argentina -
Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of
Finished Leather, ("Argentina-Bovine Hides"),5 8 the first sentence
of Article 111:2 requires a comparison of actual tax burdens rather
than nominal tax burdens.5 9 Consequently, the IC-related VAT
155 Japan -Alcohol, supra note 94, para. 6.21.
156 Id. para. 6.22.
157 WTO Dispute Panel Report on Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of
Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DSI55/R (Dec. 19,
2000) [hereinafter Argentina - Bovine Hides].
158 Id.
159 See id. In paragraph 11.181-11.184 of its Report, the Panel of Argentina -
Bovine Hides reasoned:
Article 111:2, first sentence, stipulates that imported products must not be
subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any
kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products." It is apparent that the application of this Article calls for a
comparison of "taxes" or "charges" imposed on imported products with "taxes"
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rebate programs exclusively available to China's domestic IC
fabricators have caused an excessive "actual tax burden"' 60 for
U.S. IC exporters.
Second, Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties ("Vienna Convention")'6 1 requires that "a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose."'162  Even though the "tax revenue
rebate" is not within the ordinary meaning of the phrase "taxes or
other internal charges," it, nonetheless, should be read counter-
or "charges" applied to like domestic products. What is less apparent is under
what aspect those taxes or charges are to be compared.
In this regard, it is necessary to recall the purpose of Article 111:2, first sentence,
which is to ensure "equality of competitive conditions between imported and
like domestic products" (footnote omitted). Accordingly, Article 111:2, first
sentence, is not concerned with taxes or charges as such or the policy purposes
Members pursue with them, but with their economic impact on the competitive
opportunities of imported and like domestic products. It follows, in our view,
that what must be compared are the tax burdens imposed on the taxed products.
We consider that Article 111:2, first sentence, requires a comparison of actual tax
burdens rather than merely of nominal tax burdens. Were it otherwise, Members
could easily evade its disciplines. Thus, even where imported and like domestic
products are subject to identical tax rates, the actual tax burden can still be
heavier on imported products. This could be the case, for instance, where
different methods of computing tax bases lead to a greater actual tax burden for
imported products. In this regard, the GATT 1947 panel in Japan - Alcoholic
Beverages I has stated that:
".... in assessing whether there is tax discrimination, account is to be taken
not only of the rate of the applicable internal tax but also of the taxation
methods (e.g. different kinds of internal taxes, direct taxation of the
finished product or indirect taxation by taxing the raw materials used in the
product during the various stages of its production) and of the rules for the
tax collection (e.g. basis of assessment)" (footnote omitted).
It may thus be stated, in more general terms, that a determination of whether an
infringement of Article 111:2, first sentence, exists must be made on the basis of
an overall assessment of the actual tax burdens imposed on imported products,
on the one hand, and like domestic products, on the other hand.
Argentina - Bovine Hides, supra note 157, paras. 11.181-11.184.
160 Id.
161 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
162 Id. art. 31.1.
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intuitively into the meaning of the latter phrase "in the light of" the
"object and purpose" of Article 111:2."63 As stated in the Appellate
Body Report on Japan - Alcohol, the "broad and fundamental
purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the application
of internal tax and regulatory measures."' 64 More specifically, the
stated purpose of Article III "is to ensure that internal measures
'not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production. '''65 China's reading of the
phrase "taxes or other internal charges," which excludes the rebate
of tax revenues, might be viewed as defeating the "object and
purpose"'166 of Article III.
Third, the United States could probably use the same strategy
as assessed in the discussion with respect to GATT Article
111:8(b) 167 to some local Chinese tax bureaus that are collecting
VAT at the rate of 3%, irrespective of the "rebate" requirement in
various circulars issued by the central government. The U.S.
could allege that the implementation of the VAT rebate program is
imposing different tax rates as a matter of fact.
b. The Second Sentence of Article 111:2
According to the Appellate Body Report of Japan - Alcohol, it
is well established that the second sentence of Article 111:2 invokes
the provision in Article 111:1.16' Three separate issues must be
addressed to determine whether an internal tax measure is
inconsistent with Article 11I:1: (i) the imported products and the
domestic products are "directly competitive or substitutable
products" which are in competition with each other; (ii) the
directly competitive or substitutable imported and domestic
products are "not similarly taxed;" and (iii) the dissimilar taxation
of the directly competitive or substitutable imported domestic
163 See National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation, May 1952, GATT
B.I.S.D. (Vol. I(I)), art. 111.2 (1952).
164 Japan - Alcohol, supra note 94.
165 Id. (quoting Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th
Supp.) para. 5.10 (1990)).
166 Japan - Alcohol, supra note 94.
167 See discussion supra Part IV.C. 1.
168 Japan -Alcohol, supra note 94, at 18.
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products is "applied... so as to afford protection to domestic
production." 1
69
As to the first and the second elements of this three-tiered test,
arguments available to both China and the United States, as
discussed in the preceding section with respect to the first sentence
of Article 111:1, can be repeated here. 7' If China could not
establish that the imported ICs are taxed in excess of the domestic
ICs, it probably would not be able to convince the adjudicators
that they are taxed in a similar manner. As to the directly
competitive and substitutable products, all China could argue on a
technical level is that such products encompass a larger category
of products than the scope of like products. Factors such as
physical characteristics, end-users, tariff classifications,
marketplace, and econometric criteria, such as the elasticity of
substitution, should all be considered in the determination of
directly competitive and substitutable products.
171
China's compliance with the second sentence of Article 111:2
might be materially jeopardized under the third element of the
three-tiered test: whether the measure is applied "so as to afford
protection to domestic production." This is true even though, as is
shown below, WTO jurisprudence on how to determine this factor
is somewhat unsettled, especially with regard to whether the
regulator's legislative purpose should be taken into account by the
WTO adjudicators.
In its Report on Japan - Alcohol, the Appellate Body stated
that "although it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily
ascertained, nevertheless its protective application can most often
be discerned from the design, the architecture, and the revealing
structure of a measure."'' 72 Further, the Appellate Body stated that
"[t]he very magnitude of the dissimilar taxation in a particular case
may be evidence of [its] protective application .... In
169 Id. at 24.
170 See discussion supra Part IV.C.1.
171 Japan - Alcohol, supra note 94, at 25.
172 Id. at 29 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Appellate Body in Japan - Alcohol
rejected the consideration of the subjective intent of the legislators and regulators in the
drafting and enactment of a particular measure, believing that such intent was irrelevant
for ascertaining whether a measure is applied "so as to afford protection to domestic
production." Id. at 27.
173 Id. at 29.
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examining the design, architecture, and structure of Japan's
challenged measures, the Appellate Body concluded that the
measures were applied "so as to afford protection of domestic
production."' 74  The Appellate Body noted the following facts
from the Panel Report:
[T]he combination of customs duties and internal taxation in
Japan has the following impact: on one hand, it makes it difficult
for foreign-produced shochu to penetrate the Japanese market
and, on the other, it does not guarantee equality of competitive
conditions between shochu and the rest of "white" and "brown"
spirits. Thus, through a combination of high import duties and
differentiated internal taxes, Japan manages to "isolate"
domestically produced shochu from foreign competition, be it
foreign produced shuchu or any other of the mentioned white
and brown spirits. 17
5
Under this standard, it appears that China's VAT rebate
programs for IC fabricators have almost the same qualities that (i)
make it difficult for foreign ICs to penetrate the Chinese market,
(ii) fail to guarantee the equality of competitive conditions
between domestic ICs and their directly competitive and
substitutable products, and (iii) isolate domestic IC fabricators
from foreign competition.
Some commentators believe that the WTO adjudicators should
look, and actually are looking, at legislative intent when
examining whether the measure is applied "so as to afford
protection to domestic production.' 76  The protectionist purpose
of China's IC-related VAT rebate programs is, perhaps, even more
obvious if examined under this legislative intent approach. To be
174 Id. at 31.
175 Id.
176 See Robert Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem
for an "Aim and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619, 620 (1998) (describing the relevance
of protectionist intent); Donald Regan, Regulatory Purpose and "Like Products" in
Article 111:4 of the GA7T (With Additional Remarks on Article 1l:2), 36 J. WORLD
TRADE 443, 464 (2002). The Appellate Body imputes this view in at least two of its
Reports. See Canada - Periodicals, supra note 131, para. 30 (noting that the design and
structure of a Canadian taxation measure was designed to afford protection to domestic
periodicals); Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS87, 1 10/R (June
15, 1999), at 48-53 (holding that a Chilean taxation scheme which offered protection to
domestic alcoholic beverage production was inconsistent with GATT requirements).
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sure, the legislative intent of the IC VAT rebate programs is
clearly stated in Chapter One of Circular No. 18, which the author
has translated in its entirely as follows:
CHAPTER ONE: POLICY OBJECTIVES
Article 1: By means of policy guidance, capital and talent will
be encouraged to flow to the software industry and IC industries,
thus, the rapid development of China's information industry will
be further promoted, and [China will be able to] acquire
software research and development and production capacity at
or close to the level of advanced international standard by 2010,
and to become one the major IC development and fabrication
bases in the world.
Article 2: [These policies are formulated] to encourage domestic
enterprises to make full use of both foreign and domestic
resources and make efforts to develop [both domestic and
foreign] markets;... to enable domestically fabricated IC
products to satisfy most of the domestic market demand and be
exported in considerable quantities; and to further narrow the
gap with developed countries in [IC] development and
production technology.
177
V. Issues Relating to GATS Article XVII
A. An Overview of GATS Article XVII
Paragraph I of GATS Article XVII states that, for the sectors
inscribed in its Schedule (and subject to any conditions and
qualifications set out therein), each Member must "accord to
services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of
all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less
favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers." 17 8 As a result, the WTO Members are essentially free
to make specific commitments in opening their services markets.
The national treatment obligation applies to any sectors or sub-
sectors that are listed in the Schedules of each Member (usually
177 Circular No. 18, Ch. 1, supra note 8.
178 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB, Art. XVII:I, 33 I.L.M. 1167,
1180 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
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under the titles of "market access" and "national treatment"). 7 9
Therefore, it bears emphasis that when a WTO Member does not
make a specific offer on certain services in its Schedules, it does
not have to observe the national treatment obligation imposed in
Article XVII of GATS, although it still has to obey the MFN
provision in Article II of GATS. 80
According to a footnote attached to Paragraph 1 of GATS
Article XVII, a WTO Member is not required to provide
compensation for any inherent competitive disadvantages that
result from the foreign character of the relevant service or service
providers. Yet, this does not authorize actions that might modify
conditions of competition against services and service suppliers
which are already disadvantaged due to their foreign character.
B. The U.S. Challenge to China's IC VAT Policies under
GA TS Article XVII
In the Request for Consultation submitted by the United States,
the allegation of a violation of the GATS national treatment
obligation is casually described as follows: "In addition, we
understand that China allows for a partial refund of VAT for
domestically-designed ICs that, because of technological
limitations, are manufactured outside of China. China thus
appears to be... discriminating against services and service
suppliers of other Members."''
Ostensibly, China's VAT rebate policy for imported IC chips
designed in China, as embodied in Circular No. 140, was the focus
of the attack again in-this context. Presumably, the United States
alleged that such a program is granting favorable treatment to IC
179 According to Art. XX:2 of GATS, if a discriminatory measure is inscribed in the
"market access" column of the Schedules, it is also presumed to be inscribed in the
"national treatment" column. See id. art. XX:2.
180 This approach is also described as the "positive list approach," which amounts to
having the WTO Members observe market access and national treatment related
discipline only to the extent that they undertook specific obligations (by making the
corresponding specific commitments in their Schedules) in a given service sector. See
Bernard Hoekman, The General Agreement on Trade in Services, Paper Prepared for
Presentation at an OECD Workshop on The New World Trading System (Apr. 25-26,
1994) (reprinted with permission in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 925 (3d ed. 1995)).
181 Request for Consultation, supra note 59.
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chip designers in China because IC chips designed by them may
enjoy an up to 11% VAT rebate from the government, while IC
chips designed by foreigners cannot enjoy such tax rebates. The
Request for Consultation does not point out which kind of services
and what types of service suppliers are being discriminated against
under China's VAT rebate policy for imported IC chips designed
in China, but it is conceivable from the context of this dispute that
the "services" should be "IC designing services," and the "service
suppliers" should be "foreign IC designers." In order for such
services and service suppliers to be discriminated against under
this VAT rebate program, the mode of the services should
typically be "cross border supply" or "consumption abroad,"'
82
and the service suppliers must be located outside the territory of
China.
C. Discussion of China's Domestic IC Designer VAT
Incentive Programs Under GATS Article XVII
1. Test for Finding an Inconsistency with GATS Article
XVII
The case law in connection with GATS Article XVII has
developed a three-prong test for inconsistency, which is described
in the Panel Report on European Communities - Regime for the
International Sale and Distribution of Bananas'83  ("EC -
Bananas"):
In order to establish a breach of the national treatment obligation
of Article XVII, three elements need to be demonstrated: (i) the
EC has undertaken a commitment in a relevant sector and mode
of supply; (ii) the EC has adopted or applied a measure affecting
the supply of services in that sector and/or mode of supply; and
(iii) the EC's measure accords to service suppliers of any other
Member treatment less favourable than that it accords to the
EC's own like service suppliers.' 84
182 See GATT Secretariat, Incorporation of Commitments Resulting from Current
Services Negotiations into Members' GATS Schedules, WTO Doc. S/CSC/W/33, at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language= 1 &= 1 (March 6, 2002).
183 GATT Dispute Panel Report on European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by the United States, WTO
Doc. WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997) [hereinafter EC - Bananas (Panel Report)].
184 Id. para. 6.100.
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The following analysis of China's VAT rebate policy for
domestically designed ICs is discussed in accordance with this
methodology.
2. Specific Commitment Made by China
Upon its accession into the WTO, China made its specific
commitments with respect to trade in services as an Addendum to
the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China
("Services Schedule").'85 The Services Schedule does not contain
any reference to the designing services of ICs. However, the
silence of the Services Schedule in this regard should not be
understood to mean that China has not made any specific
commitment in the IC designing services sector. A closer look at
the United Nations Provisional Central Production Classification
(CPC"),186 upon which Members of the WTO relied on when
scheduling their specific commitments under GATS, suggests that
IC designing services may be a subset of "engineering design
services for industrial processes and production (CPC 86725),"
which is a subcategory of "engineering services (CPC 8672)."'187 in
the Services Schedule, engineering services are explicitly scheduled
in "item e" of Part II:A.'88 The commitments made by the Chinese
government corresponding to engineering services are provided in
the following chart 89:
185 See WTO Ministerial Conference, Report of the Working Party on the Accession
of China, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/3/Add.2, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto
_e/acc-e/completeacc-e.htm (Nov. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Report of the Working Party]
(annexing to the Protocol of Accession of China the Schedule of Specific Commitments
on Services resulting from the negotiations between the People's Republic of China and
the WTO Members).
186 Provisional Central Product Classification, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/
77, E.91.XVII.7, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/family2.asp?CI=9
187 Id.
188 See Id.
189 Report of the Working Party, supra note 185.
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E'ngineering SerNiCeS (CPC 867 2) & MN es of Supply
Limitation on Market Limitation on Additional
Access National Treatment Commitments
None for scheme design.
Cross-Border Co-operation with Chinese
Supply professional organizations Noneis required except scheme
designs
Consumption None None
Abroad
Only in the form of joint Foreign Service
ventures, with foreign suppliers shall be
majority ownership registered architects
majrityweri or engineers, or
Commercial permtted r enterprises engaged
Presence Within five years after in architectural,Ch na's accession to the eniergo
WTO, wholly foreign- engineering, or
owned enterprises will be services, in their
permitted home country
Unbound, except as
Presence of Unbound, except as indicated in
Natural indicated in Horizontal intal
Persons Commitments Coimntscommitments
It follows from the above commitments that, with respect to
cross-border supply and consumption abroad of engineering
services, China has committed to grant national treatment to
foreign service suppliers and will not limit their market access
except for the service of "scheme design." 9 ° Clearly, the VAT
rebate program for imported IC chips designed in China is not
scheduled here as an exception to the "none" commitment with
regard to market access and national treatment. Therefore, there
should be no doubt that the first prong of the test as set forth by
the Panel Report on EC - Bananas has been satisfied.
190 The Services Schedule does not provide any definition or explanation of "scheme
design." See Id., supra note 185. Under some circumstances, the term "scheme" may
include "electronic circuits" within the scope of its definition. Id. Therefore, this concept
may also capture IC designing services, provided that China can furnish sufficient
technical evidence to that effect. Id.
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3. Measure Affecting Trade in Service
In determining whether a measure affects trade in services, the
following comments made by the Appellate Body in its Report on
EC - Bananas are worth noting:
In our view, the use of the term "affecting" reflects the intent of
the drafters to give a broad reach to the GATS. The ordinary
meaning of the word "affecting" implies a measure that has "an
effect on", which indicate a broad scope of application. This
interpretation is further reinforced by the conclusions of
previous panels that the term "affecting" in the context of
Article III of the GATT is wider in scope than such terms as
"regulating" or "governing."' 91
The Appellate Body also upheld the finding by the Panel of
EC - Bananas that there is no legal basis for an "a priori
exclusion of measures within the EC banana import licensing
regime from the scope of the GATS."'
192
The Appellate Body Report on Canada -Autos provided more
detailed guidelines to aid in determining whether a measure is
affecting trade in service:
With these treaty provisions in mind, we believe that at least two
key legal issues must be examined to determine whether a
measure is one "affecting trade in services": first, whether there
is "trade in services" in the sense of Article 1:2; and, second,
whether the measure in issue "affects" such trade in services
within the meaning of Article 1: 1.193
When examining these two requirements, the Appellate Body
understood that the first leg of this test was satisfied because
Canada did not challenge the fact that there were established
suppliers in its market.'94 As to the second leg of this two-pronged
test, the Appellate Body pointed out that the challenger of the
measure should bear the burden of proof on how exactly a
191 GATT Dispute Settlement Report of the Appellate Body on European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
Complaint by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) para. 220
[hereinafter EC - Bananas (Complaint by US)].
192 Id.
193 Canada -Autos (Appellate Body), supra note 66, para. 155.
194 Id. para. 157.
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particular measure affects trade in goods or services, and the Panel
should also examine who supplies such services and how such
services are supplied. 95 In other words, the Appellate Body
requires the WTO adjudicators to undertake a market analysis to
determine whether the measure "affects" trade in services. The
specific method of such market analysis was not spelled out in the
Appellate Body Report, however.
In light of these rulings, it would be hard for China to argue
that the VAT rebate policy for imported IC chips designed in
China affects trade in goods only. Given the contingency of the
location of chip designers when implementing the VAT rebate
upon importation, it is not difficult to envisage that some IC
fabricators would prefer to have their chips designed in China in
order to enjoy the VAT rebate when exporting the chips to China.
However, pursuant to the Appellate Body's ruling in Canada -
Autos, such an assumption is not sufficient to establish the case.
The United States would have the obligation to furnish concrete
economic data with respect to how the U.S. domestic IC designers
have been jeopardized by China's VAT policy favoring the
Chinese chip designers. Given the vast technology gap between
Chinese IC designers and their U.S. counterparts, the effect of
such a rebate policy could well be statistically de minimus.
4. Like Service/Service Providers
In the Panel Report on EC - Bananas, the Panel addressed the
issue of likeness under GATS Article XVII.196 It concluded:
[I]n our view, the nature and the characteristics of wholesale
transactions as such, as well as of each of the different
subordinated services mentioned in the headnote to section 6 of
the CPC, are "like" when supplied in connection with wholesale
services, irrespective of whether these services are supplied with
respect to bananas of EC and traditional ACP origin, on the one
hand, or with respect to bananas of third-country or non-
traditional ACP origin, on the other. Indeed, it seems that each
of the different service activities taken individually is virtually
the same and can only be distinguished by referring to the origin
of the bananas in respect of which the service activity is being
195 Id. paras. 160-64.
196 This finding was not reviewed by the Appellate Body on appeal.
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performed. Similarly, in our view, to the extent that entities
provide these like services, they are like service suppliers.
19 7
Consequently, it appears that the CPC classification is a vital
tool in determining the likeness of services. By contrast, the
relevance of likeness of products in connection with the service
tends to be minimal. Likewise, the distinction in the mode of
supply of services is also not a reliable parameter to determine like
services. Indeed, the Panel of Canada - Auto has explicitly
rejected using different modes of supply to decide the likeness of
services in the context of GATS Article XVII. 98  Such a
proposition was not rejected by the Appellate Body on appeal. As
a result, services supplied in a Member of the WTO through mode
3 (commercial presence) and mode 4 (presence of natural persons)
can be "like services" of those supplied from territories of other
Members through mode 1 (cross-border supply) and mode 2
(consumption abroad). 99
In the face of the above WTO case law, it will be hard for
China to distinguish the likeness of its domestic IC designing
services from the IC designing services provided by U.S. IC
designers, despite the fact that they are supplied through different
modes and have different niche markets.
5. Less Favorable Treatment
Unlike the jurisprudence under GATT Article III, the WTO
jurisprudence regarding the determination of whether an adopted
measure accords treatment less favorable to services/service
suppliers from foreign countries than that accorded to domestic
like counterparts is relatively scarce.
In this regard, a highly analogous case decided by the WTO
adjudicating body on the legal issue discussed in this subsection is
in the Panel Report on Canada - Autos. The complainants in that
case argued that the challenged Canadian Value Added ("CVA")
requirements and the duty exemption create an economic incentive
for manufacturer beneficiaries to purchase services supplied in
Canada, thereby modifying the conditions of competition in favor
197 EC - Bananas (Panel Report), supra note 183, para. 7.322.
198 Canada -Autos (Pai:el Report), supra note 103, paras. 10.300-10.301.
199 Id. para. 10.307.
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of services supplied in Canada. 00 The Panel noted that the CVA
requirements and the duty exemption provide an incentive for the
beneficiaries of the import duty exemption to use services supplied
within Canada over "like" services supplied in or from the
territory of other Members through modes 1 and 2.201 This
modified the conditions of competition in favor of services
supplied within Canada. Although the measures do not distinguish
on their face between services supplied by service suppliers of
Canada and those supplied by service suppliers of other Members
present in Canada, the Panel considered that they are bound to
have a "discriminatory effect" against services supplied through
modes 1 and 2, which were services of other Members. °2 On this
basis, the Panel concluded that the CVA requirements, operating
in conjunction with the duty exemption, accorded less favorable
treatment to services of other Members supplied through modes 1
and 2 and are, therefore, inconsistent with Canada's obligations
under GATS Article XVII. 203 This proposition by the Panel was
not reviewed by the Appellate Body upon appeal.
There is almost no doubt that the VAT rebate program for
imported IC chips designed in China has the "effect" of giving
incentives to consumers, both Chinese and foreign, of IC
designing services to choose designers located in China, provided
that they intend to import such IC chips to China. Such an
objective is also stated in the policy goals quoted in the
discussions above.2
°4
VI. Completing the Analysis: Issues Relating to Subsidies
As previously mentioned, there is a solid argument that
China's VAT rebate programs for IC industry constitute a subsidy
to its domestic IC industry and, therefore, was exempted from the
application of the national treatment requirement prescribed under
200 Id. para. 10.306. The CVA is a set of requirements for the eligible to enjoy,
among others, the import duty exemption. Id. One component of the CVA requirement
was "maintenance and repair work executed in Canada on buildings, machinery and used
production purposes." Id.
201 Id. para. 10.307.
202 Id. para. 10.307.
203 Id. para. 10.308.
204 See discussion supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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GATT Article 111.25 Nevertheless, bringing the programs out of
the purview of GATT Article III does not completely justify them
under all WTO rules. The VAT rebate program implemented by
the Chinese government should also live up to the legal standards
set forth in the SCM Agreement.
A. Can the DSB Raise the Subsidy Issue on Its Own Motion?
In the Request for Consultations submitted by the United
States, the subsidy issue was not raised.2 °6 As the defending party
in the dispute settlement proceeding, the Chinese government also
did not subject its measure's conformity to the SCM Agreement.27
Therefore, an inevitable threshold issue for the WTO adjudicators,
even before reviewing the subsidy issue in connection with
China's VAT rebate programs, would be whether the adjudicators
are authorized to review a government measure sua sponte.
The text of the DSU is silent on this issue. Nevertheless, some
rulings by the Appellate Body in prior cases have addressed this
problem by stating that a panel is fully authorized to review legal
issues not raised by the parties on its own motion in exceptional
circumstances. The most relevant holding to this effect appears in
the Appellate Body Report on Mexico - Anti-Dumping
Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the
United States, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United
States20 8 ("Mexico - HFCS"). In its report, the Appellate Body
made it clear that there are at least two instances where a panel
comes under a duty to address issues. First, as a matter of due
process and the proper exercise of the judicial function, panels are
required to address issues that are put before them by the parties to
a dispute.2°9 Second, panels must address and dispose of certain
issues of a fundamental nature, even if the parties to the dispute
remain silent on those issues.2'0 The Appellate Body defined its
205 See supra Part IV.C.1.
206 Request for Consultation, supra note 59.
207 See id.
208 WTO Secretariat, Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United
States, WTO Doc. WT/DS I 32/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Mexico-HFCS].
209 Id. para. 36.
210 Id.
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task in the second type of situation as "[determining] whether the
'objections' that Mexico now raises before us are of such a nature
that they could have deprived the Panel of its authority to deal
with and dispose of the matter., 211 As an example of what would
meet the standard, the Appellate Body recalled its statement in the
United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916212 ("U.S. - 1916") that
panels must address "jurisdictional" issues on their own
initiative.213
Based on this premise, the Appellate Body noted that Mexico
had failed to raise clearly before the Panel the issues that it was
appealing, so the Panel had no duty to review them as required
under the first type of situation.214 In examining whether the
second situation arose, the Appellate Body found that none of the
procedural issues raised by Mexico (such as the lack of
consultations, failure to indicate whether consultations had been
held, and alleged failure to exercise judgment in deciding whether
bringing the action to WTO dispute settlement would be fruitful)
were sufficient to trigger this duty.2 5  The Panel was also not
required to address these issues on its own motion.
16
Turning to the dispute between the United States and China,
the United States probably never would want to put the subsidy
issue before the Panel or the Appellate Body for review. 217 As a
result, the first situation envisaged in the Appellate Body Report
of Mexico - HFCS would not be likely to appear. It is also highly
doubtful whether the adjudicators would deem the substantive
issue of subsidy as depriving it of "authority to deal with and
211 Id. para. 53.
212 WTO Secretariat, United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WTO Doc.
WT/DS 132/AB/R, WT/DS 162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000).
213 See discussion supra note 130, and accompanying text.
214 Mexico - HFCS, supra note 208, paras. 39-48.
215 Id. para. 74.
216 Id. paras. 51-75.
217 In fact, the United States probably does not want the panel to examine China's
VAT rebate policy under the SCM Agreement, as bringing the programs under the SCM
Agreement would clearly prejudice the U.S. claim with respect to China's violation of
Article III. In other words, it can be read that the United States has, itself, admitted that
China's VAT rebate programs are a kind of subsidy and, therefore, should enjoy the
exception provided under Article III:8(b) of GATT.
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dispose of the matter. ' ' 21 Unlike the issue of jurisdiction in
Mexico - HFCS, the Panel's refusal to consider the issue of
subsidy would not in any way impair its ability or authority to
consider other issues raised by the United States in its request
(such as a violation of Articles I and III of GATT). Consequently,
it is unlikely that the adjudicating body would consider it sua
sponte by applying the two-situation analysis in the Appellate
Body Report on Mexico - HFCS.
Another procedural barrier for the United States to raise the
subsidy issue in the current dispute lies in the provision of the
SCM Agreement itself. No matter what type of subsidy China's
VAT rebate programs fall into, the SCM Agreement requires the
United States to request consultation with China before resorting
to the WTO dispute settlement tribunal or imposing countervailing
measures. 219 The United States did not request any consultation
with China to this effect.
B. Substantive Subsidy Issues Relating to China's VAT
Rebate Programs and Their Compliance with the SCM
Agreement
1. Do China's VAT Rebate Programs Constitute a
Subsidy?
A subsidy covered under the SCM Agreement must meet two
threshold requirements: (i) it must represent a cost to government
and a benefit to recipient, 220 and (ii) it must be specific, in the
sense that it must be granted to an enterprise or industry or group
of enterprises or industries.221
There is little doubt about China's satisfaction of these two
elements. By definition, the tax rebate constitutes a "direct
transfer of funds" as stipulated in Article 1.1(a)(i) of the SCM
Agreement. It is also clear from the language of Circular Nos. 18,
25 and 70 that these transfers of funds are exclusively directed at
China's domestic IC fabricators, who have particularly benefited
218 See discussion supra note 212, and accompanying text.
219 SCM Agreement, supra note 81, arts. 4, 7, & 9.
220 Id. art. 1.
221 Id. art. 2.
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from the rebated tax revenues.222 Hence, there seems to be no
issue in this regard.
2. Are China's VAT Rebate Programs Permissible
Under the SCM Agreement?
It is well established in the WTO rules and relevant case law
that a subsidy program covered under the SCM Agreement is not
per se illegal.223 The SCM Agreement classifies subsidies covered
thereunder into three classes: prohibited (Article 3), actionable
(Article 5), and non-actionable (Article 8).
a. The Lapse of Non-Actionable Subsidies
According to Article 8.2(a) of the SCM Agreement, certain
types of assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by
higher education or research establishments on a contract basis are
non-actionable.224 Since part of the goal of China's VAT rebate
222 See Circular No. 18, supra note 8, art. 41; Circular No. 25, supra note 36, art. 2;
and Circular No. 70, supra note 45, art. 1.
223 See SCM Agreement, supra note 81, art. 8; see also Indonesia - Autos, supra
note 70, para. 5.148.
224 Article 8.2(a) of the SCM Agreement reads in its entirety as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the following subsidies shall
be non-actionable:
(a) assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by higher education
or research establishments on a contract basis with firms if:
the assistance covers not more than 75 per cent of the costs of industrial
research or 50 per cent of the costs of pre-competitive development activity;
and provided that such assistance is limited exclusively to:
(i) costs of personnel (researchers, technicians and other supporting
staff employed exclusively in the research activity);
(ii) costs of instruments, equipment, land and buildings used
exclusively and permanently (except when disposed of on a
commercial basis) for the research activity;
(iii) costs of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively for
the research activity, including bought-in research, technical
knowledge, patents, etc.;
(iv) additional overhead costs incurred directly as a result of the
research activity;
(v) other running costs (such as those of materials, supplies and the
like), incurred directly as a result of the research activity. (Footnotes
omitted.)
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program is to stimulate the country's research and development of
IC products and designing capabilities,225 China might attempt to
rely on this provision to justify the subsidy. Yet, even if the VAT
rebates to China's domestic IC fabricators and designers were
carried out on a contractual basis and the notification requirement
set forth in Article 8.3 of the SCM Agreement was satisfied,226 the
provision with respect to non-actionable subsidy would no longer
be helpful by virtue of the operation of Article 31 of the SCM
Agreement. Article 31 provides:
[T]he provisions of... Article 8... shall apply for a period of
five years, beginning with the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement. Not later than 180 days before the end of this
period, the [WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures]
Committee shall review the operation of those provisions, with a
view to determining whether to extend their application, either
as presently drafted or in a modified form, for a further
period.227
Since no consensus has been reached by the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Committee of the WTO in this regard,
Article 8 of the SCM Agreement ceased to be operative as of
December 3 1, 1999.228
As a result, within the current WTO subsidy legal regime,
there are only two types of subsidies covered under the SCM
Agreement: prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies.229
b. Prohibited Subsidies
A subsidy is prohibited if it is either contingent (in law or in
fact, solely or partially) upon export performance or contingent
225 Id. art. 8.2(a) (footnotes omitted).
226 From the language of the relevant government documents with respect to the
VAT rebate programs, it seems that the rebates are not implemented exclusively for
research and development, and their recipients are not required to enter into contracts
with the Chinese government. In addition, the author is unaware of any notification by
the Chinese government to the WTO with respect to such rebates.
227 Id. art. 31.
228 See id. See also, WTO, Overview on Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/scm-e/subse.htm
(last visited on May 6, 2004).
229 Id.
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(solely or partially) upon the use of domestic over imported
goods.230
(i) Contingency on Export Performance
It is plain from the wording of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM
Agreement that subsidies contingent on export can be either de
jure or de facto.23' Although one of the policy goals of China's
VAT rebate programs for its IC industry is to enhance the export
of IC products and designs,232 the relevant government documents
do not explicitly state that export performance is a condition to the
eligibility or the amount of VAT rebates from the government.
Therefore, it would not be difficult for China to establish that the
VAT rebate programs fail to contain any export performance
contingency.
As to the finding of de facto export contingency with respect
to China's VAT rebate programs, relevant DSB reports have
shown that an enhanced standard is imposed by the adjudicating
body of the WTO. 233 In the Panel Report on Australia-Subsidies
Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automative Leather
("Australia-Leather"), the Panel reasoned that the terms
"contingent... in fact" and "in fact tied to" suggest an
interpretation that "requires a close connection between the grant
or maintenance of a subsidy and export performance., 23 4  The
Panel of Australia - Leather further pointed out that "the mere fact
that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export cannot be the
sole basis for concluding that a subsidy is 'in fact' contingent upon
export performance," '235 and so the adjudicators should "examine
all the facts concerning the grant or maintenance of the challenged
subsidy, including the nature of the subsidy, its structure and
operation, and the circumstances in which it was provided. 236
230 Id. art. 3.1.
231 Id. art. 3.1(a) n. 4; WTO, Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and
Exporters of Automotive Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DS126/R (May 25, 1999) at 363-73
[hereinafter Australia - Leather].
232 Circular No. 18, supra note 8, art. 2.
233 See, e.g., Australia-Leather, supra note 231.
234 Id. at 105-06, para. 9.56.
235 Id. at 106, para. 9.56.
236 Id. at 106, para. 9.57.
[Vol. 30
A DEFENSELESS POLICY?
In the Appellate Body Report on Canada - Measures Affecting
the Export of Civilian Aircraft237 ("Canada - Aircraft"), a three-
prong test was developed to determine whether a subsidy is de
facto contingent on export performance: "first, the 'granting of a
subsidy'; second, 'is... tied to...'; and, third, 'actual or
anticipated exportation or export earnings.' 238 While the first and
the third prongs denoted in the Appellate Body Report of Canada
- Aircraft should not be difficult to discern in China's VAT rebate
programs, the second prong calls for an extensive factual analysis,
and standards in locating such "ties" are still murky in the relevant
jurisprudence of the WTO.239 The Appellate Body addressed the
second prong in its Report on Canada - Aircraft, stating that "a
relationship of conditionality of dependence must be
demonstrated" and "[i]t does not suffice to demonstrate solely that
a government granting a subsidy anticipated that exports would
result. ' 24  The Appellate Body subsequently added in its DSU
Article 21.5 review of the Canada - Aircraft case that the high
export-orientation of a subsidized industry was not enough for the
Appellate Body to find export contingency.
241
What stems from the above analysis is that the United States
would bear a strong evidentiary burden of proof to establish the
second prong of de facto export contingency in the dispute with
China. The fact that China's export of IC products increased
during the period of subsidization would not be a determinative
factor in this regard.
(ii) Contingency on Use of Domestic Over-
Imported Goods
The only potential issue under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement is China's VAT rebate policy for imported IC chips
237 WTO, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Canada - Aircraft].
238 Id. para 169.
239 Id. para. 171.
240 Id. (emphasis in original).
241 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU (WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/RW),
para. 49.
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designed in China.242 To be sure, this rebate program is beneficial
to China's domestic importers that import IC chips designed in
China.243 In other words, this rebate program is contingent on the
procurement of domestic "IC design services" over foreign like
services. 2" This "service contingency" feature should effectively
relieve China's VAT rebate policy for imported IC chips from the
ambit of prohibited subsidy provided in Article 3.1 (b) of the SCM
Agreement, which only deals with the contingency on the use of
domestic goods.245
c. Actionable Subsidies
As noted in Part VI.B.2.a., due to the cease of operation of
Article 8 of the SCM Agreement, there are only two types of
subsidies covered under the WTO subsidy legal framework.246
Therefore, it seems only natural to conclude that if a subsidy
satisfies the elements set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM
Agreement but does not fall into the ambit of prohibited subsidies
as provided under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, it will
automatically become an actionable subsidy regulated by Articles
5 to 7 of the SCM Agreement.
247
The SCM Agreement permits an actionable subsidy unless it
causes "adverse effect" to the interests of other Members of
WTO. 248 Article 5 of the SCM Agreement enumerates the types of
adverse effect:
(a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member;
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or
indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular the
benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994;
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.249
242 See discussion supra Part H.
243 SCM Agreement, supra note 81, art. 3.1(b).
244 Id.
245 Id. art. 5.
246 See discussion of Art. 8 of the SCM Agreement in Part VI.B.2a of this Article,
supra.
247 SCM Agreement, supra note 81, art. 5.
248 Id.
249 Id.
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According to footnote 11 of Article 5(a) of the SCM
Agreement, an adverse effect of injury to another Member's
domestic industry requires establishment of the same injury level
as set forth in Part V (countervailing duties) of the SCM
Agreement.2 10  Consequently, in order for the United States to
assert a domestic industry injury, an investigation in accordance
with Article 11 of the SCM Agreement is necessary.25'
As to the second type of adverse effect, nullification or
impairment of benefits, the most harmful assertion that could be
made by the United States with respect to China's subsidy to the
IC industry would be a "non-violation nullification and
impairment., 212 In this connection, the relevant case law of the
WTO appears in the Panel Report on United States - Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000253 ("U.S. - Offset Act
2000"). The Panel of U.S. - Offset Act 2000 noted that in previous
WTO cases, a non-violation complaint is a "rather unusual
remedy" and that it "should be approached with caution and
should remain an exceptional remedy."254 By citing a GATT-era
panel report, the Panel of U.S. - Offset Act 2000 considered that
"non-violation nullification or impairment would arise when the
effect of a tariff concession is systematically offset or counteracted
by a subsidy programme., 255 The Panel found this approach to be
"reasonable" since "a standard of 'systematic
offsetting/counteracting' would preserve the exceptional nature"
of a non-violation remedy.256 Similar to the situation under Article
5(a) of the SCM Agreement (regarding injury to domestic
industry), the establishment of a systematic offsetting or
counteracting by the United States should warrant thorough
250 Id. art. 5(a), n. 11. This footnote states that "[t]he term 'injury to the domestic
industry' is used here in the same sense as it is used in Part V." Id.
251 Id. art. 5(a), n. 11, art. 11.
252 If the United States could establish a "violation nullification and impairment," it
would have relied more heavily on the specific provision violated by China rather than
Article 5 of the SCM Agreement.
253 United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
WT/DS217/R (Sept. 16, 2002).
254 Id. para. 7.125.
255 Id. paras. 7.126-7.127.
256 Id. paras. 7.126-7.127.
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investigations by U.S. international trade authorities. It appears to
be fairly difficult for the challenger to prove due to the exceptional
nature of a non-violation complaint of nullification and
impairment. 7 In addition, in addressing the issue of nullification
and impairment, the Panel of U.S. - Offset Act 2000 noted the
relevance of whether Mexico could have reasonably predicted at
the completion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that
the United States would pass the Offset Act.258 By analogy, China
could rebut the U.S. argument of possible nullification and
impairment by pointing out that Circulars Nos. 18 and 25 were
promulgated before China's accession to the WTO, 259 and,
therefore, the effect of the circulars should have been reasonably
anticipated by the United States.
Finally, the issue of serious prejudice as the third type of
adverse effect should be dealt with in conjunction to Article 6 of
the SCM Agreement, which enumerates a numbers of situations
where serious prejudice occurs and situations where serious
prejudice does not apply. 60 In order to qualify for this type of
adverse effect, the challenging party must prove any of the
following four effects as prescribed in Article 6.3 of the SCM
Agreement:
(a) the effect of displacing or impeding the imports of a like
product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing
Member;
(b) the effect of displacing or impeding the exports of a like
product of another Member into a third country market;
(c) the effect of a significant price undercutting by the
subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product
of another Member in the same market or significant price
suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market; or
(d) the effect of any increase in the world market share of the
subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product
or commodity as compared to its average share during the
257 Id. paras. 7.125-7.127.
258 Id. para. 7.131.
259 Circular No. 18 was promulgated on June 24, 2000, and Circular No. 25 was
promulgated on Sept. 22, 2000. China officially joined the WTO on December 11, 2001.
See, www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/countriese/chinae.htm. (last visited Apr. 2, 2004)
260 SCM Agreement, supra note 81, art. 6.
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previous three year period and where this increase follows a
consistent trend over a period when subsidies have been
granted.26'
Again, without solid facts substantiated by the United States in
connection with any of these effects, the WTO adjudicating body
will not recognize the adverse effect in the form of serious
prejudice.262
VII.Conclusion
Based on an overall assessment of the dispute discussed in this
Article, the case is not as one-sided as many critics have
suggested.263 China and the United States retain some legal
grounds in support of their positions. If the case does not settle,
China could probably defend its position on procedural and
evidentiary grounds. Conversely, for the United States to prevail
in the case, it would carry a heavy burden of proof to establish
factually a violation (or, as the case may be, non-violation) of
China's VAT rebate programs. This assessment reveals again the
principle, emphasized by numerous WTO treaty provisions and
case law, that discrimination and subsidizing are not per se illegal
under the WTO legal regime, although they are immediately
suspected to run afoul of the WTO rules.264
Nevertheless, even if China could defend itself in the dispute
before the WTO tribunal on procedural and evidentiary grounds,
this dispute should sufficiently alert China, as well as many other
WTO Members implementing the VAT system, to the harms
inherent in utilizing a VAT policy to achieve its fiscal objectives.
Compared to an income tax, VAT is particularly vulnerable to
attacks along the lines of Articles I and III of GATT, presumably
due to its inherent product-oriented nature. In fact, China has
maintained a preferential income tax exemption system for certain
domestic enterprises for a considerable period of time,265 and it has
261 Id. art. 6.3.
262 Id. art 6.
263 See, e.g., HOWELL ET AL., supra note 57.
264 See SCM Agreement, supra note 81, arts. 1, 3, 8, 27.
265 For example, for some manufacturing foreign-invested enterprises, beginning
from their first profitable fiscal year, the Chinese government offers a statutory two-year
income tax holiday and subsequent three-year 50% income tax exemption. See GENSLER
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never encountered any challenge from other countries before or
after its accession to the WTO on the ground of national treatment
or MFN. Therefore, if China changes the form of the VAT rebate
to its domestic IC fabricators into income tax exemption programs
exclusively applicable to them, the legal challenges posed by the
United States in this dispute may be rendered moot. For instance,
it would be hard to imagine a type of national treatment violation
caused by enterprise income tax schemes, as foreign exporters are
normally not subject to the income tax jurisdiction of the
266importing country' s government.
Another way China could have minimized the risk of violating
GATT rules is to have explicitly structured the VAT rebate regime
as a type of subsidy. 267 This type of subsidy could be based on the
preferential treatments for developing countries as sanctioned in
Article 27 of the SCM Agreement (regarding special and
differential treatment of developing countries), and China could
notify the relevant committee in the WTO of its intention to
implement such a subsidy.268
Thus, as seen by the alternatives available to the Chinese
government, different forms of taxation schemes and methods can
lead to different WTO legal implications, although such forms are
aimed at similar substantive policy goals. The goal of this Article
is to encourage the development of China's IC industry. Yet,
should this kind of "form over substance" ideology find standing
and/or ultimately be encouraged under the WTO legal regime?
This is a larger question yet to be answered.
ET AL., supra note 23, at 63 (translating Article 8 of The Income Tax Law for Foreign
Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises of the PRC (adopted and promulgated
by the Seventh National People's Congress on Apr. 9, 1991)) [hereinafter Income Tax
Law].
266 See Id., art. 1.
267 In relevant circulars discussed in this Article, the Chinese government does not
seem to have expressly featured the VAT rebates concerned as a form of government
subsidy program.
268 SCM Agreement, supra note 81, art. 27.
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